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ABSTRACT
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) represents a historic achievement for the
global disability rights movement. Yet, when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify it on December 4, 2012, its
influence on American law and policy seemed doomed. The Founders, after all, had conceived of a constitutional
vision where the federal government acts as the ultimate arbiter of questions of international policy. Under this
vision of “dual federalism”—which dominated how the legal profession understood U.S. involvement in foreign
affairs for over a century—only the federal political branches have the power to make and implement international
laws like the CRPD. But, as I show in this Article, dual federalism has not endured. “Subnational entities”—
cities, counties, and states—have become key decision-makers in areas once dominated by the federal government,
such as immigration and international trade. As it turns out, they have also become champions of the CRPD.
This Article explains that “foreign affairs federalism” is at the heart of this paradigm shift. This new status quo
reveals that the Constitution leaves ample room for subnational entities to engage on issues of international scale.
In many cases, it has enabled local and state governments to act antagonistically—or “uncooperatively”—toward
the federal government. In others, it has empowered subnational entities and federal actors to work hand-inhand—or “cooperatively”—to drive national foreign affairs priorities. This Article shows that U.S. subnational
entities have implemented the CRPD in accordance with principles of uncooperative and cooperative foreign affairs
federalism. From an uncooperative perspective, subnational entities have denounced the Senate’s refusal to ratify
the CRPD through resolutions and other expressive policies. From a cooperative perspective, the supported
decision-making (“SDM”) movement serves as an exemplar case study. Embedded in Article 12 of the CRPD,
SDM represents a shift away from guardianship law and toward the ability of people with disabilities to make
life decisions on their own. This Article shows that the ongoing flourishing of SDM laws across the United States
is due in large part to alliances between state-level disability rights organizations and the federal executive branch.
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Like other formal institutions, treaties are causally meaningful to the extent that they
empower individuals, groups, or parts of the state with different rights preferences that
were not empowered to the same extent in the absence of treaties.
—Beth Simmons1

INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”)
represents a landmark achievement for the global disability rights
movement. The only human rights treaty adopted by the United Nations
(“U.N.”) so far in the twenty-first century, the CRPD has worked to provide
comprehensive civil, political, and social rights to people with disabilities.2
Perhaps more strikingly, it came into existence through an unprecedented
negotiations process that involved cooperation between both nation-states
and members of civil society—namely, Disabled Peoples’ Organizations
(“DPOs”), which are non-governmental groups organized and led by people
with disabilities.3 But whatever the CRPD’s success in bringing disability
rights to the forefront of contemporary human rights work, its influence on
American law and policy seemed unlikely when the U.S. Senate refused to
ratify it on December 4, 2012.4
Recall that the Founders conceived of a constitutional vision where the
federal government would act as the sole and ultimate arbiter of questions of

1
2

3

4

BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS 125 (2009).
See Michael Ashley Stein, Janet E. Lord, & Penelope J.S. Stein, The Law and Politics of US Participation
in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2 EUR. Y.B. DISABILITY L. 29, 35 (2010)
(“The CRPD holistically combines civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural
rights in an effort to manifest the Vienna Declaration’s notion that human rights are truly
‘indivisible and interrelated and interconnected.’”) (quoting World Conference on Human Rights,
14–25 June 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (12 July 1993)).
See Janet E. Lord, David Suozzi, and Allyn L. Taylor, Lessons from the Experience of U.N. Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance, 38 J.L.
MED. ETHICS 564, 567–68 (2010) (explaining the crucial role that DPOs played in the CRPD’s
negotiation process).
Under an orthodox understanding of foreign affairs law, the Senate would have to ratify a treaty
for it to have domestic influence because other entities, including local and state governments, lack
the power to carry out obligations under international law by themselves. See LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150 (2d ed. 1996) (“At the end of
the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards U.S. foreign relations, the states
‘do not exist.’”); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617,
1620 (1997) (explaining the conventional idea that “[t]he federal government has the exclusive
power to conduct foreign relations free from interference by states.”). This understanding, rather
unfortunately, prevails among experts. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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foreign policy: “If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to
be in respect to other nations,” wrote James Madison in the Federalist No. 42.5
On this view, only representatives of the federal political branches have the
necessary power to make, implement, and comply with international treaties.
And without the constitutionally mandated two-thirds vote of approval in
the Senate, such treaties become dead letters with neither force of law nor
formal authority.6 This vision has crystallized as one of “dual federalism,”
where the “powers relating to war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and
finance” belong to the federal government, not to the states.7
For well over a century after the country’s founding, dual federalism
dominated how jurists, policymakers, and scholars understood American
involvement in foreign affairs.8 Wisdom and practice dictated that
diplomacy and other forms of international policymaking were the business
of federal actors. In the meantime, states were to oversee domestic matters,
such as the health and well-being of their populations. Starting in earnest
around the Second World War, however, the seemingly rigid boundaries of
dual federalism began to crumble.9 From that point forward, the pressures
of globalization and the fast-increasing interconnectedness of the world’s
societies made differentiating foreign from domestic activities a matter of art
rather than science.10 An unpredicted phenomenon of national scale also
started taking hold. American “subnational entities”—a term I will use to
denominate cities, counties, and states—became key players in areas of
foreign affairs once dominated by the federal government.11

5

6

7
8

9
10

11

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 91 (James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009); see also Ernest
A. Young, Foreign Affairs Federalism in the United States 259, 260, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019) (“The 1789 Constitution,
which replaced the [Articles of Confederation], aimed both to centralize the conduct of foreign
policy in the national government and to enable that government to bring the states into line.”)
(internal citation omitted).
The two-third vote requirement, along with the signature of the President, are unique to the U.S.
legislative system, under obligation from the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. II § 2 (“[The
President] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 5, at 100 (James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009).
See Young, supra note 5, at 261 (“[Dual federalism] dominated American constitutional law for over
a century; courts invalidated state regulation impinging on interstate commerce and limited
national legislation regulating intrastate affairs.”).
See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
See Yishai Blank, The City and the World, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 875, 883 (2006) (“[I]t seems
that globalization marks a real transformation of, and perhaps departure from the current national
order in which sovereignty, understood as the absolute control of the nation, through its political
institutions, over the whole national territory and its populace played a major role.”).
See infra Part II.A.
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Cities and states—such as Philadelphia through its status as a “sanctuary
city” and California through its divisive “Save Our State” initiative—
became active decision-makers on questions of immigration policy.12
Subnational entities worked to mitigate global warming by forming
accountability agreements with foreign entities and even vowed to comply
with treaties that the federal government had shunned, such as the Paris
Agreement.13 As I show in this Article, moreover, local and state
governments have also become champions of the CRPD and international
disability rights.14 But what structural issues led to this new paradigm?
What, as a legal matter, has justified subnational entities to defy so openly
the rules, norms, and expectations of dual federalism?
Enter “foreign affairs federalism.”15 This now-prevailing regime is
remarkable, and of considerable interest to legal scholars, because it reveals
that orthodox understandings of federal constitutional power rested on a
fallacy: that the Constitution vests exclusive authority to the federal
government on issues of international importance.16 In reality, the
Constitution leaves much room for subnational entities to engage on matters

12

13

14
15

16

See Andrea Silva, How California’s Prop. 187 Is Still Shaping Immigration Policy—25 Years After It Passed,
WASH. POST. (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/25/howcalifornias-prop-is-still-shaping-immigration-policy-years-after-it-passed/
[https://perma.cc/6C58-CR4Y] (explaining that Proposition 187 “denied public, social,
educational and health services to undocumented immigrants in California”); David Gambacorta
& Kavitha Surana, Even in Philadelphia, One of the Most Determined Sanctuary Cities, Refuge Is Elusive,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 18, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/even-inphiladelphia-one-of-the-most-determined-sanctuary-cities-refuge-is-elusive [https://perma.cc/
PN7H-AMRK] (writing that Philadelphia has “wore its sanctuary reputation like a badge of
honor” and has tried to find “ways to outmaneuver ICE’s enforcement efforts.”).
See generally Jean Galbraith, Two Faces of Foreign Affairs Federalism and What They Mean for Climate Change
Mitigation, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 274, 274 (2018); Dana R. Fisher, Understanding the
Relationship Between Subnational and National Climate Change Politics in the United States: Toward a Theory of
Boomerang Federalism, 31 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 769, 771–781 (2012).
See infra Part II–III.
In this Article, I draw a lot from Michael Glennon and Robert Sloane’s remarkable book on the
question of foreign affairs federalism. See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D. SLOANE,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016). But their book
is, of course, by no means exhaustive. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1225–26 (1999); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and
Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 167 (2001); Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq,
Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 768 (2013); Ryan Baasch &
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Congress and the Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 47, 52 (2016); Young, supra note 5, at 259.
See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the One-Voice Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 975 (2001); see also GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 31 (“Doubtless the United States
constitutionally must, at times, speak with one voice. . . . But [it] does not, in fact, always speak
with one voice in foreign relations.”).
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of foreign affairs and human rights.17 From this standpoint, therefore,
foreign affairs federalism constitutes the foundation from which subnational
entities have promoted the CRPD on U.S. soil. And it is, in the same spirit,
the engine that has propelled much human rights advocacy and mobilization
across the country.
Scholarship has also shown that foreign affairs federalism is a nuanced,
multi-flavored doctrine that entails more than mere subnational
participation on issues of international dimension. In many instances, it has
enabled subnational entities to act antagonistically—or “uncooperatively”—
toward the federal government.18 That is, local and state governments have
adopted foreign affairs policies that conflict with those adopted by the federal
government. In other situations, foreign affairs federalism has empowered
subnational entities and federal actors to work hand-in-hand—or
“cooperatively”—to drive national foreign affairs priorities.19
This Article draws on original research to show that this pattern of
“uncooperative and cooperative foreign affairs federalism” accords with how
local and state governments have championed the CRPD.20 From an
uncooperative standpoint, many cities and counties have denounced the
Senate’s refusal to ratify the CRPD through resolutions and other expressive
policies.21 Several states have also enacted measures to push the Senate in
the direction of ratification. These expressions of discontent have done little
to convince the requisite supermajority of sixty-seven senators to ratify the
Convention, to be sure. Despite the spearheading and overwhelmingly
bipartisan work on disability rights in the United States—notably through
17
18

19

20

21

See infra Part II.A.
“Uncooperative federalism” commonly refers to Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken’s
canonical essay on the question. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009). Scholars have since studied and applied
the conception widely. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. And it is not dissimilar from
Yishai Blank’s conception of the novel “World-State-Locality” trinity, where, he argues, “local
governments can now use international law in their struggle against their states and other localities
. . . .” Blank, supra note 10, at 889.
“Cooperative federalism” does not, of course, limit itself to questions of foreign affairs. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, & Sam Kamin, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 116 (2015) (“Cooperative federalism has been described as ‘a
partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective.’”)
(quoting Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992)); see also generally Philip J. Weiser, Federal
Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692,
1696 (2001); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2012).
See Jean Galbraith, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2131,
2138–39, n. 24 (2017) (collecting “scholarly work addressing state and local engagement in foreign
affairs”).
See infra Part II.B.
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the passage of the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)22—a
stubborn coalition of conservative senators has persistently prevented the
country from joining the rest of the world in ratifying the CRPD. Even so,
I argue that the subtle resistance on the part of local and state governments
has accomplished two expressive purposes.23 The first is to signal to the rest
of the world that U.S. subnational entities are committed to the international
causes of disability justice and human rights. The second, less obvious
purpose serves to reaffirm the role played by subnational entities in the U.S.
system of federalism.
From a cooperative perspective, the supported decision-making (“SDM”)
movement serves as a case in point. During the CRPD negotiations, SDM
was a construct that certain key stakeholders, namely DPOs, fervently
supported.24 SDM came in response to concerns about guardianship laws,
and more specifically, how they had become a mechanism systematically
used to usurp the dignity and decision-making ability of people with
disabilities.25 Ultimately enshrined in Article 12 of the CRPD, SDM has
become a way to empower people with disabilities to make life decisions
without having to depend on the approval and decision-making powers of
others.26
The adoption of SDM laws began gaining real traction at the end of
President Barack Obama’s first term. In October 2012, a roundtable
convened under the auspices of the U.S. Administration for Community
Living (“ACL”) and the American Bar Association (“ABA”) to find concrete

22
23
24
25
26

See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2009).
See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Part III.A.
See id.
As Anna Nilsson and Lucy Series remark, that SDM does not appear explicitly in the language of
Article 12 is intentional: “Ambiguity was a necessary cost of unity for the advocacy strategy of
disability organizations participating in the negotiations of the Convention . . . .” Anna Nilsson &
Lucy Series, Article 12 CRPD: Equal Recognition Before the Law, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A COMMENTARY 339, 341 (Ilias Bantekas et al. eds.,
2018). That said, a consensus exists around the idea that Article 12 was meant, at least in
substantial part, to move past a system of substituted decision-making toward one of supported
decision-making. See infra Part III.A. See also generally Andrew Peterson, Jason Karlawish & Emily
Largent, Supported Decision Making With People at the Margins of Autonomy, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Nov.
2021, at 1–21; Emily A. Largent & Andrew Peterson, Supported Decision-Making in the United States and
Abroad, 23 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y, 271 (2021); but see Nina A. Kohn, Legislating Supported
Decision-Making, 58 HARV. J. LEGIS. 313 (2021) (offering a thought-provoking critique of current
SDM statutes laws, including the idea that they may, in fact, disempower individuals with
disabilities despite their stated intentions).
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ways to reform guardianship in ways consistent with Article 12.27 This
roundtable marked the beginning of an effort on the part of the executive
branch, through the ACL, to help galvanize state-level SDM advocacy
across the nation. At least eighteen states and the District of Columbia have
enacted SDM laws since then, and many more remain in the legislative
process.28 Although not all these states have been influenced by the ACL,
legislative records and other primary sources show that many among them
have passed SDM laws on account of grassroots advocacy supported by
ACL-provided grants. These findings, along with several state court
decisions that have integrated Article 12 language in their reasoning, show
the influence that the CRPD has had on shaping the U.S. guardianship
reform movement.29 They also illustrate that federal–state coordination was
necessary to mobilize SDM advocacy within U.S. borders.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I overview two features of
the CRPD that have made it a trailblazer in disability policy: its
comprehensive protections for people with disabilities and its inclusive
negotiation process.
I then contrast these achievements with the
Convention’s reception in the United States, paying particular attention to
the different legal, policy, and political reasons that senators offered to
oppose the treaty’s ratification. In Part II, I provide the constitutional and
normative justifications underpinning foreign affairs federalism. I then
explore how local and state governments have exercised their autonomy to
champion the CRPD through expressive policies. Leaning on subnational
resolutions pushing for CRPD ratification, I argue that these policies have
enabled local and state governments to show support for international
disability justice and human rights, and to reaffirm their role in the American
system of federalism. In Part III, I examine the SDM movement in the
United States and argue that Article 12 was a necessary but not sufficient
factor in bringing it about. I explain that the drafters of the CRPD codified
SDM as a way of moving away from the ubiquitous use of guardianship, a
system that has often usurped the dignity and decision-making ability of
people with disabilities. I conclude with a discussion about how the CRPD
has come to influence SDM policymaking in the United States, focusing on

27

28
29

See Roundtable, Beyond Guardianship: Supported Decision-Making by Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities,
AM. BAR ASS’N (2012), https://rethinkingguardianshipnc.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/
1731/2021/06/Beyond-Guardianship-Supported-Decision-Making-by-Individuals-with-IDD2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9T9-2Y4K] (last visited May 21, 2022).
See generally Part III.B.
See generally id.
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how the federal government has created the infrastructure necessary to
implement Article 12 policy in several states across the country.
I. CRPD NON-RATIFICATION IN CONTEXT
This Part explores the Senate’s decision not to ratify the CRPD. For the
reader familiar with the Senate’s recent treatment of human rights treaties,
it may tell an old story: The U.N. adopts a landmark human rights treaty,
which the Senate then declines to ratify for reasons that appear, at least on
the surface, entirely partisan.30 But, seen in a different light, I would consider
the discussion below as setting the stage for a more nuanced understanding
of the CRPD’s reception in the United States. It is a prelude of sorts to a
story that opposes the claim that the Convention’s impact on U.S. disability
rights died in the Senate.31 The reality is more dynamic and revelatory of
the unpredictable ways in which human rights norms can shape domestic
policy agendas.32
Below, I first provide an overview of the CRPD, spotlighting some of the
features that have made it a trailblazer in disability policy. I then provide
the justifications behind the Senate’s decision not to ratify the CRPD. This
discussion gives rise to an enigma that has puzzled many foreign affairs and
30

31

32

See Jean Galbraith, Human Rights Treaties in and Beyond the Senate: The Spirit Of Senator Proxmire, in FOR
THE SAKE OF PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CRIME, AND JUSTICE IN HONOUR OF ROGER S. CLARK 507, 508–09 (Suzannah Linton, et. al.
eds., 2015) (explaining that, since 1994, when the United States ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention against Torture, no other
human rights treaty has received ratification).
See Arlene S. Kanter, Let’s Try Again: Why the United States Should Ratify the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of People with Disabilities, 35 TOURO L. REV. 301, 343 (2019) (“In fact, the defeat of the
ratification of the CRPD marks the beginning of what has become a new wave of United States
isolationism and antipathy towards the international legal order.”); see also Statement on Senate CRPD
Vote, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND (Feb. 19, 2013), https://dredf.org/2013/02/19/
statement-on-todays-senate-crpd-vote/ [https://perma.cc/EUS7-G77X] (“By not ratifying the
Treaty, the US fails to advance the human rights principles it once championed in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, the landmark disability civil rights law upon which the CRPD is
largely based.”); Ted Kaufman, The Senate Refuses to Lend Support for People with Disabilities, DEL.
ONLINE (Mar. 22, 2014, 5:22 PM), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/
columnists/ted-kaufman/2014/03/22/the-senate-refuses-to-lend-support-for-people-withdisabilities/6726001/ [https://perma.cc/XZ46-8X84] (“CRPD will probably come up for a vote
again in the full Senate this summer. Without a change of six votes, disabled people around the
world will needlessly be denied equal opportunities, and the United States will lose some of its
international moral authority.”).
For a discussion of the myriad ways in which human rights implementation occurs within domestic
legal frameworks, see generally Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of
Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 83 WASH. L.
REV. 449 (2008).
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disability rights experts: Did the Senate reject a Convention that was
inspired, at least in part, by U.S. disability law and policy?33 As I explain
below, the answer is “yes.”
A. A Disability Rights Trailblazer
The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CRPD and its Optional
Protocol in December 2006.34 The CRPD then opened for signature on
March 30, 2007. That day, eighty-two states parties signed onto it—the
largest ever number of signatories to a U.N. treaty on an opening day.35 On
May 3, 2008, the CRPD entered into force after receiving its 20th
ratification.36 Today, the CRPD has 164 signatories and 184 states parties.37
The CRPD is a remarkable achievement not least because it is the “most
rapidly negotiated”38 human rights treaty ever and “the first comprehensive
human rights treaty of the 21st century. . . .”39 It also possesses two qualities
that make it a disability policy trailblazer: the substantive protections it
affords to people with disabilities and its highly inclusive process of
negotiation.40

33

34
35

36

37

38
39
40

See JOHN R. VAUGHN, FINDING THE GAPS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES (CRPD) (May 12, 2008) (“During the six years of the drafting of the
Convention, . . . [t]he U.S. delegation drew on our nation’s prolific experience with disability laws
and policies in providing guidance on the foundational principles of the Convention.”). I also offer
more support for this point infra Part II.B.1.a.
G.A. Res. 61/611 (Dec. 13, 2006).
See
Convention
on
the
Rights
of
Persons
with
Disabilities,
U.N.,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-withdisabilities.html [https://perma.cc/JQL4-VUUY] (last visited May 21, 2022).
See Entry Into Force, U.N., https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-therights-of-persons-with-disabilities/entry-into-force.html [https://perma.cc/SMB5-LM4Y] (last
visited May 21, 2022); see also CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
ADVOCACY TOOLKIT, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. I, V (2008),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/AdvocacyTool_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR
L6-STA3] (discussing the development and ratification of the CRPD).
Status of Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (2008), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/VRL
6-STA3].
Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
U.N., supra note 35.
See Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 167, 177 (2008) (“Indeed, the physical
presence and substantive input of persons with disabilities in the treaty development process cannot
be over-emphasized as having affected both the substantive outcomes described above, and the
procedural guarantees that followed.”).
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1. Substantive Protections
The CRPD’s protections encompass “the spectrum of life activities of
persons with disabilities.”41 They arise from a “purpose” that does not lack
in ambition: “to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities,
and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.”42 The CRPD’s definition
of “persons with disabilities” is similarly comprehensive, covering all “those
who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.”43 Together, the
CRPD’s protections and the breadth of people to whom it applies have
created “a great landmark in the struggle to reframe the needs and concerns
of persons with disability in terms of human rights.”44
The CRPD’s structure is straightforward. The first nine Articles set out
definitions,45 interpretive provisions,46 and general principles that are
applicable throughout the Convention’s implementation,47 including those
of “non-discrimination,”48 “equality of opportunity,”49 and “equality

41

42
43
44
45

46

47
48
49

Michael Ashley Stein, A Quick Overview of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Its Implications for Americans with Disabilities, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 679, 679 (2007). For an exhaustive analysis of the CRPD’s fifty articles, see generally THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A COMMENTARY (Ilias
Bantekas et al. eds., 2018).
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, May 3, 2008, Art. 1, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRPD].
Id., Art. 1.
Kayess & French, supra note 38, at 2.
See generally CRPD, Art. 2. The definition of “reasonable accommodation” in the CRPD is highly
analogous to the “reasonable accommodation” language in the ADA. Compare CRPD, Art. 2
(“‘Reasonable accommodation’ means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments
not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to
persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms.”) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009) (defining discrimination in the
workplace as “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity.”).
See Kayess & French, supra note 38, at 26 (“Articles 1 and 2 of the CRPD are interpretive. Article
1 sets out the general purpose of the convention . . . . Article 2 defines five key terms used
repeatedly throughout the convention.”)
See id. at 27–28 (2008) (explaining that Articles 8 and 9 are “undoubtedly two of the greatest
challenges to the international community.”).
See CRPD, supra note 42, Art. 3.
Id., Art. 5.
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between men and women.”50 They also provide benchmarks with which
states parties are to comply. For example, states parties must “modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute
discrimination against persons with disabilities.”51
Articles 10 through 30 enumerate the “specific human rights and
fundamental freedoms” that the Convention protects.52 They include equal
recognition before the law (Article 12)—the idea that “persons with
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of
life”53 to which I will return in much more detail in Part III.54 They also
include freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (Article 15); liberty of movement and nationality (Article 18);
health (Article 25); habilitation and rehabilitation (Article 26); and
participation in political and public life (Article 29).
The final twenty Articles—Articles 31 through 50—focus on process.
For example, Article 31 requires states parties to amass “statistical and
research data” to facilitate proper implementation of the CRPD.55 And
Article 33 requires designating “one or more focal points within government
for matters relating to the implementation of the present Convention. . . .”56
Articles 34 through 39 also set up the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD Committee”), a designated body of
international experts that monitors the Convention’s implementation
progress.57 Under Article 35, states parties have to submit to the CRPD
Committee “a comprehensive report on measures taken to give effect to
[their] obligations” within two years of entering into the Convention, and
they have to do so every four years thereafter.58 After receiving these reports,
the CRPD Committee can then make recommendations based on its

50
51
52
53
54

55
56
57

58

Id., Art. 7.
Id., Art. 4(b).
Kayess & French, supra note 38, at 28.
CRPD, supra note 42, Art. 12(2).
As I will explain in detail infra Part III, Article 12 and the ways in which states parties have
interpreted and implemented it in domestic law are largely responsible for the flourishing of
supported decision-making laws in the United States.
See generally CRPD, supra note 42, Art. 31.
Id., Art. 33.
See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. OFF. OF HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/W
7EE-57JL] (May 21, 2022).
CRPD, supra note 42, Art. 35(1)–(2).
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interpretation of the reports and follow up with the states parties
concerned.59
Finally, Articles 41 through 50 include common treaty provisions, such
as designating the U.N. Secretary-General as the Convention’s depository
(Article 41); providing guidelines for reservations (Article 46); and detailing
the process for amending the Convention (Article 47).
2. The Convention’s Inclusive Negotiation Process
The CRPD’s drafting process also “broke new and inclusive ground.”60
One theme that united the negotiations was “that those whose interests are
directly affected by an issue must participate meaningfully in decisionmaking concerning that issue.”61 A five-word mantra—one that activists
have long used to describe the global disability rights movement62—came to
symbolize the negotiations: “Nothing about us without us.”63
DPOs were key during the negotiations. The Ad Hoc Committee tasked
a Working Group in 2003 to prepare a draft text that would serve as a basis

59
60
61

62
63

Id., Art. 36(1).
Stein & Lord, supra note 40, at 177.
Lord, Suozzi & Taylor, supra note 3, at 567. U.N. officials recognized as much the day Ecuador
became the 20th ratifying country, officially marking the Convention’s entry into force. UnderSecretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs Sha Zukang stated that the CRPD “could not
have happened without the strong dedication and commitment of both member countries and the
global disability community.” Sha Zukang, Remarks by Mr. Sha Zukang, Under-Secretary-General for
Economic and Social Affairs on the Occasion of the 20th Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities,
U.N.
DEP’T
OF
ECON.
&
SOC.
AFFS.
(Apr.
4,
2008),
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/remarks-by-mr-sha-zukang-under-secretarygeneral-for-economic-and-social-affairs-on-the-occasion-of-the-20th-ratification-of-theconvention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html
[https://perma.cc/XZ2G-E5DK].
High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour echoed similar thoughts: “Persons with
disabilities and their supporters have led the struggle for a very long time to bring this about.”
Louise Arbour, Arbour Welcomes Entry into Force of “Ground-Breaking” Convention on Disabilities, U.N.
DEP’T
OF
ECON.
&
SOC.
AFFS.
(Apr.
4,
2008),
https://www.un.org/
development/desa/disabilities/arbour-welcomes-entry-into-force-of-ground-breakingconvention-on-disabilities.html [https://perma.cc/PFK4-KK47].
See generally JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION
AND EMPOWERMENT (2000).
See, e.g., Kayess & French, supra note 38, at 4 (“[T]he formulation and future implementation of the
CRPD has been framed repeatedly . . . based on the principle of ‘nothing about us without us.’”);
Michael L. Perlin, “A Change Is Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 483, 489 (“One of the hallmarks of the process that led to the publication of the UN
convention was the participation of persons with disabilities and the clarion cry, ‘Nothing about us,
without us.’”).
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for negotiations between states parties.64 Among the Working Group were
twelve prominent DPOs from around the globe, including Inclusion
International, Disabled Peoples’ International, the World Network of Users
and Survivors of Psychiatry, and the World Federation of the Deaf.65 This
level of “civil society”66 participation was “unprecedented in the normal
course of treaty development at the United Nations.”67 As noted by
Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, the negotiations had “the highest level
of participation by representatives of civil society, overwhelmingly that of
persons with disability and disabled persons organisations, of any human
rights convention in history.”68
* * *
Because of its comprehensive protections for people with disabilities and
inclusive negotiation process, the CRPD constitutes a milestone in the
history of human rights law. Yet, despite these pathbreaking features,
enthusiasm for the Convention was not uniformly shared among U.S. federal
policymakers. In the next sub-Part, I provide the legal and policy
justifications for this phenomenon and emphasize how, in the end, political
divides determined the Convention’s fate in the U.S. Senate.
B. The CRPD in the Senate
President Obama signed the CRPD on July 30, 2009, fulfilling his 2008
presidential campaign promise to reverse the Bush Administration’s
resistance to becoming party to the Convention.69 President Obama’s
signature did not impose any positive legal obligation on the United States,
to be sure,70 but it did enable his administration to pursue a necessary step

64

65
66
67
68
69

70

U.N. Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive & Integral Int’l Convention on the Prot. & Promotion
of the Rts. & Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Rep. of the Working Grp. to the Ad Hoc Comm.,
U.N.
Doc. A/AC.265/2004/WG/1
(2004), https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable
/rights/ahcwgreport.htm [https://perma.cc/4MQH-N6UX] [hereinafter U.N. Ad Hoc Comm.].
Working Group on a Convention, U.N. ENABLE (2007), https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
rights/ahcwg.htm [https://perma.cc/6NED-9X4Q].
See U.N. Ad Hoc Comm., supra note 64.
Stein & Lord, supra note 40, at 177.
Kayess & French, supra note 38, at 3–4.
See generally S. REP. NO. 112-7 (2012); see also Stein, Lord & Stein, supra note 2, at 40 (explaining
that despite the interconnection between many aspects of the CRPD and U.S. disability law, the
Bush Administration participated but only superficially in the CRPD negotiations).
See Thomas D. Grant, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD): Some
Observations on U.S. Participation, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 171, 173 (2015) (“Where a treaty is
subject to ratification, a State that has signed the treaty is obliged ‘to refrain from acts which would
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toward ratification: transmitting the treaty to the Senate for advice and
consent.
The advice and consent process began some three months later, with a
thorough assessment of the treaty by the Senate’s Committee on Foreign
Relations (“SCFR”). After a preliminary hearing on the subject, the SCFR
favorably reported the CRPD to the Senate on July 26, 2012, by a vote of
thirteen to six.71 But the division along party lines in the SCFR’s vote was a
foreshadowing of what was to come on the full Senate floor: No Democrat
opposed ratification, while the six dissenting votes came from Republicans.72
Five out of the six minority senators expressed their views in the SCFR
report.73 Their text opened with a telling quote from President Thomas
Jefferson, principal author of the Declaration of Independence, that
appeared to capture the essence of their position: “Peace, commerce, and
honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none.”74
American exceptionalism thus emerged, at least in rhetorical form, as a
countervailing force against ratification. In reality, however, the dissenters
were likely signaling the beginning of a partisan deliberation process, one
that may have had less to do with promoting exceptionalism than fulfilling
party prerogatives.75
Shortly after the SCFR’s assessment, the ratification vote in the full
Senate occurred on December 4, 2012. The Convention received a majority
vote of approval,76 but it still fell six votes short of the two-thirds needed to

71

72
73
74

75
76

defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty’ until such time that it has ‘made its intention clear
not to become a party to the treaty.’”) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18,
May 23, 1969, Art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 336.).
S. REP. NO. 112-6, at 7 (2012). The SCFR’s report included testimony from senators who had
experienced important involvement in the passage of the ADA, including most notably Senator
Tom Harkin (D.-Ill.), who received glowing comments from his Democratic colleagues on the
SCFR. See id. at 21 (documenting Senator John Kerry lauding Senator Harkin for helping knock
down “barriers to employment and Government service” for people with disabilities through his
work on the ADA). Throughout his testimony, Senator Harkin emphasized that his and the
Senate’s work on the ADA was a precondition for the CRPD’s success across the world. See id. at
26 (“Well, thanks to the ADA and other U.S. laws, America has shown the rest of the world how
to honor the basic human rights of children and adults with disabilities.”).
Id. at 6.
Id. at 17–19.
Id. at 17. The quote by President Jefferson came from the President’s first inaugural address on
March 4, 1801. See Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, AVALON PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH.,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp [https://perma.cc/5M2T-VR7T] (last
visited May 21, 2022).
See generally infra Part I.B.1.b.
See S. REP. NO. 112-7, supra note 69.
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ratify an international treaty.77 The vote was once again largely along party
lines, with all of the Democrats and eight Republicans voting for ratification,
while thirty-eight Republicans voted against.78
After the vote, the Senate returned the CRPD to the SCFR by protocol.
Although the SCFR reassessed the Convention two years later, on July 28,
2014—once again recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent
to its ratification79—the Senate declined to proceed with a vote.80 The
Senate instead referred the CRPD back to the SCFR, where it has lain ever
since. The United States thus became, and remains, one of a handful of
countries to not ratify the CRPD, and the only permanent member of the
U.N. Security Council to have signed but not ratified it.81
1. The Reasons for Non-Ratification
Two broad justifications fueled the Senate’s decision to not ratify the
CRPD. Before examining them, however, some words of caution are
necessary: These justifications are important not because of their merits,
which are debatable at best and unfounded at worse, but because they
highlight the deep partisanship brought about by the ratification deliberation
process. They in turn bring into stronger light the platform that subnational
entities later used to champion the CRPD. The first justification was that
U.S. disability legislation, and in particular the ADA82, is robust enough to
protect the rights of Americans with disabilities. The second was that
ratifying the Convention would conflict with objectives of a specific segment
of the Republican wing of the Senate, notably on issues of abortion, national
sovereignty, and parental rights.
a. Domestic Disability Legislation
Throughout the ratification debate, both wings of the Senate proudly
acknowledged the array of legal protections afforded to people with
77

78

79
80
81
82

The two-third vote requirement, along with the signature of the President, are unique to the U.S.
legislative system, under obligation from the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. II (“[The President]
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur.”).
See Roll Call Vote 112th Congress–2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (Dec. 4, 2012),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=112&se
ssion=2&vote=00219 [https://perma.cc/2K36-YAMB].
S. REP. NO. 113-12, at 8 (2014).
S. REP. NO. 112-7, supra note 69.
See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, supra note 37 (listing the signatories and ratifiers of the CRDP).
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2009).
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disabilities, including most notably the overwhelmingly bipartisan ADA. For
example, Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), one of the authors of the first SCFR
report, recognized that the United States has “a comprehensive network of
existing federal and state disability laws and enforcement mechanisms,”
enumerating some thirteen statutes to this effect.83 The minority senators
affirmed much of the same sentiment, stating that the country “has already
set the highest standard for treatment of and assistance to the disabled; so
much so that the drafters of this Convention used U.S. laws and regulations
to build its framework.”84
Furthermore, the Obama Administration even proposed,85 and the
SCFR adopted,86 a reservation to the CRPD that made “clear that the
United States will limit its obligations under the Convention to exclude the
narrow circumstances in which implementation of the Convention could
otherwise implicate federalism or private conduct concerns.”87 The reason
for this reservation was that “[i]n the large majority of cases, existing federal
and state law meets or exceeds the requirements of the Convention,” so no
new “implementing legislation” is needed to fulfill the treaty’s mandates.88
Accordingly, the disagreement between Democrats and Republicans did
not center on the CRPD’s effect on domestic disability rights policy. Both
parties agreed that the ADA had set the gold standard, and that pre-existing
laws already fulfilled the Convention’s demands. Instead, their disagreement
centered on the utility of ratifying a Convention that was, on one hand, no
better than useless at home and, on the other, of questionable value abroad.
In the second SCFR report, Senator Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) concisely made this
point:
As the United States is the leader on disabilities policy in the world, I’m not
certain higher ground is even a possibility. The [ADA] has been the law of
the land since 1990 and is recognized as the gold standard. In fact, it serves
as the basis for much of this treaty. In addition, the United States Agency
for International Development already administers programs across the
globe aimed at helping the disabled.89

83

84
85
86
87
88
89

See S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 6. Senator Kerry also noted that “disability
nondiscrimination provisions have been integrated into statutes of general applicability to federal
policies and programs.” Id.
Id. at 18.
S. REP. NO. 112-7, supra note 69, at 1.
See S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 7.
Id. at 6–7.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 113-12, supra note 79, at 37.
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On these views, the legal developments in disability rights that had
occurred before the CRPD’s entry into force became tools that Democrats
and Republicans used in contrasting ways. Democrats wanted to export
their legislative successes abroad and become leaders in international
disability policy. By contrast, opposing Republicans questioned whether
doing so was even possible or useful.90 But their differences did not stop
there. More decisive of the CRPD’s fate were policy and political concerns
that surfaced on the right side of the aisle between the SCFR’s vote and that
of the Senate.
b. Policy Explanations
I should emphasize at the outset that a comprehensive examination of
the policy concerns raised during the deliberation process would go beyond
the scope of this Article. Still, several are worth analyzing here because of
their ultimate impact in shaping public discourse about the ratification
process.91
Abortion. One consistent concern was that ratifying the CRPD would
become a vehicle for pro-choice policy. The locus of this concern was Article
25, which requires states parties to “[p]rovide persons with disabilities with
the same range, quality and standard of free or affordable health care and
programmes as provided to other persons, including in the area of sexual and
reproductive health . . . .”92 Although Article 25 does not specifically mention
abortion, nor does any credible authority support the claim that the right to
abortion is covered by the CRPD,93 the dissenting senators argued that it

90

91

92
93

Said otherwise, in the words of Senator Flake, “it would appear that ratification of this treaty would
be little more than a symbolic gesture. I remain concerned that ratifying a treaty for purely
symbolic purposes would dilute the importance and integrity of the treaty process altogether.” Id.
at 38.
For an in-depth analysis of policy concerns raised by senators during the ratification debate, I would
recommend a report written by the Congressional Research Service. See LUISA BLANCHFIELD &
CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 15–20 (2015).
See CRPD, supra note 42, Art. 25 (emphasis added).
To this effect, Amnesty International, an openly pro-choice organization, has stated that “[t]here
is no generally accepted right to abortion in international human rights law.” Women, Violence and
Health, AMNESTY INT’L (2005), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act77/001/2005/en/
[https://perma.cc/WY8S-Q9JH]; see also Andrea Stevens, Pushing a Right to Abortion through the Back
Door: The Need for Integrity in the U.N. Treaty Monitoring System, and Perhaps a Treaty Amendment, 6 PENN
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFFS. 70, 76 (2018) (“No U.N. human rights treaty speaks of a right to abortion,
and . . . neither does customary international law provide for such a right.”). That said, a
movement may be developing in that direction. See, e.g., Rachel Rebouché, Abortion Rights as Human
Rights, 25 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 765 (2016).
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leaves ample room for a pro-choice interpretation.94 They thus claimed that
domestic democratic processes are better suited than international law to
make judgments about this “highly controversial”95 subject.
National Sovereignty. Another policy concern was that the CRPD
Committee would overshadow domestic policymakers in the Convention’s
interpretation and implementation in the United States. For example, the
minority senators in the second SCFR report argued that “while an
American might be a member of the Committee, it is clear that even having
such a representative would not fully provide the United States with the
opportunity to have our national interests represented . . . .”96 So American
policy, the argument continued, “would be subjected to the oversight and
commentary of the CRPD committee, which could issue unlimited
recommendations that the U.S. would be expected to implement.”97
The congressional record makes clear, however, that this position
represented an incorrect interpretation of the U.S. stance toward ratification.
As I have already noted, the SCFR included a declaration in the resolution
of advice and consent stating that “current United States law fulfills or
exceeds the obligations of the Convention . . . .”98 This declaration meant
that the United States would reject any policy recommendation made by the
CRPD Committee because, at least in theory, no room for increased
compliance would be possible. And even if ratified, the CRPD would not be
94

95
96
97

98

Reporting about the controversy surrounding Article 25 of the CRPD also abounded during the
ratification debate in the Senate. See, e.g., Brian Tashman, Religious Right Groups Work to Defeat Treaty
on Rights of People with Disabilities, Falsely Claim it Sanctions Abortion, RIGHT WING WATCH (Nov. 29,
2012, 4:40 PM), https://www.rightwingwatch.org/post/religious-right-groups-work-to-defeattreaty-on-rights-of-people-with-disabilities-falsely-claim-it-sanctions-abortion/ [https://perma.cc
/P4G4-FQL9] (arguing that the Republicans’ concern about a pro-choice interpretation is
misguided); Grace Melton, U.N. Disabilities Treaty Leaves Door Open for Abortion Advocates, DAILY
SIGNAL (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.dailysignal.com/2012/08/01/u-n-disabilities-treaty-leavesdoor-open-for-abortion-advocates/ [https://perma.cc/C6WA-T7J3] (arguing that “[t]he full
Senate should refuse to ratify the CRPD . . . and decline to give abortion advocates yet another
U.N. document to use in their arsenal.”).
The minority senators effectively used the same language in both reports. S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra
note 71, at 18; S. REP. NO. 113-12, supra note 79, at 33.
See S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 34.
Grace Melton, Another U.N. Convention that Poses Threats to U.S. Sovereignty, DAILY SIGNAL (July 13,
2012), https://www.dailysignal.com/2012/07/13/another-u-n-convention-that-poses-threats-tou-s-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/M55F-QY3E].
S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 14. For reference, a declaration under international law
constitutes a country’s interpretation of a treaty matter and does not “exclude or modify the legal
effect of a treaty.” See Glossary, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml#declarations [https://perma.cc/YR2H9APU] (last visited May 21, 2022) (“Declarations can . . . be treaties in the generic sense intended
to be binding at international law.”).

364

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:2

self-executing, meaning that the CRPD Committee by itself would have no
ability to provide enforceable rights to Americans.99
Parental Rights. A third policy concern was that ratifying the CRPD would
usurp parental autonomy by empowering the state to make education and
health care decisions for children with disabilities.100 Article 7 requires that
in state actions “concerning children with disabilities, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.”101 According to Senator Richard
John Santorum (R-Pa.), this Article would have “put the government, acting
under U.N. authority, in the position to determine for all children with
disabilities what is best for them.”102 Yet, again in the resolution of advice
and consent, the SCFR stated that “nothing in Article 7 requires a change
to existing United States law,”103 thereby undercutting the argument that the
CRPD would usurp parental decision-making on issues of child
development.
These policy issues represent only a snapshot of those raised during the
ratification debate, but they nonetheless illustrate the political opposition
that the CRPD elicited. As I explain below, however, local and state
governments picked up where the Senate left off in varying ways—some
concrete and others symbolic—and their championing of the CRPD
continues to this very day.

99
100

101
102

103

See S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 14.
Homeschooling advocates, in particular, had cited this concern to support their opposition to
ratification. See, e.g., Maggie Severns, Bob Dole Battles Home-Schoolers, POLITICO (July 22, 2014, 12:17
AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/bob-dole-home-school-legal-defense-109201
[https://perma.cc/4YDQ-ZNU6] (stating that the president of the Homeschool Legal Defense
Association said that the CRPD “could infringe on the rights of parents whose children have
disabilities”).
CRPD, supra note 42, Art. 7(2).
Rick Santorum, This Treaty Crushes U.S. Sovereignty, WND (Dec. 2, 2012, 8:43 PM),
https://www.wnd.com/2012/12/this-treaty-crushes-u-s-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/5LU889R3]. Senator Santorum’s position was not without opposition. See, e.g., Dana Millbank,
Opinion, Santorum’s New Cause: Opposing the Disabled, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/santorums-new-cause-opposing-the-disabled/2012
/11/26/9ab0605a-3829-11e2-b01f-5f55b193f58f_story.html [https://perma.cc/449D-BBQ8]
(“The treaty requires virtually nothing of the United States.”).
S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 14. Senator Chris Coons (D.-Conn.) reaffirmed this point the
day of the ratification vote, saying that the CRPD “does nothing to empower an international
convention of bureaucrats to direct the schooling of children in Delaware, West Virginia, Indiana,
or in Massachusetts.” 158 CONG. REC. S7370 (2012).
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II. SUBNATIONAL ENTITIES AS CHAMPIONS OF THE CRPD
This Part and the next make up the heart of this Article. They examine
subnational efforts to uphold the CRPD within U.S. borders. For the
skeptical reader, what follows may appear unremarkable. Subnational
entities have, after all, a long history of championing human rights treaties
when the Senate has failed to ratify them.104 So what makes the CRPD an
interesting case?
My answer is two-fold. First, I use original research to show how local
and state governments have exercised their constitutional autonomy to
support the CRPD through expressive means. This discussion contributes
to an underdeveloped literature using expressivism as a theoretical
framework to examine subnational involvement in human rights and other
issues of global importance. Second, I analyze the flourishing of SDM laws
across the country. Because SDM derives from Article 12 of the CRPD,105
these laws constitute a unique case study to understand the Convention’s
impact on U.S. disability law and policy.
But, before I proceed with these matters, I will bring to the fore two
necessary threshold issues: What as a matter of law empowers local and state
governments to participate in foreign affairs policy? And beyond the

104

105

Glennon and Sloane have made this point concisely:
Human rights have been another common concern [for local governments]. The United
States declined to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW). But that did not deter San Francisco from adopting local
ordinances to implement portions of it. San Francisco’s efforts, in turn, prompted other
states and cities to call for regulations and implementation. Coalitions in Chicago, Los
Angeles, and Atlanta have urged federal legislators to approve CEDAW. Similarly, the
federal government’s recalcitrance in implementing the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the United States ratified but declared nonself-executing, did not deter local officials in Iowa, California, and New York from
enacting local implementing legislation.
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 63–64 (footnotes omitted); see also COLUM. L. SCH., HUM.
RTS. INST., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: HOW STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN
USE HUMAN RIGHTS TO ADVANCE LOCAL POLICY 10 (2012) (discussing local cities and states
that have passed resolutions on the Convention on the Rights of the Child); Galbraith, supra note
20, at 2151 (“Sometimes state and local government activity in relation to foreign affairs occurs
against a backdrop of federal inaction, as is the case with the incorporation of unratified human
rights treaties into the municipal law of progressive cities.”).
I will cover this topic in far more specificity infra Part III. But several works, at this juncture in this
Article, can serve as primers on the relationship between supported decision-making laws and
Article 12. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity,
Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 92 (2012); Kristin Booth Glen, Piloting
Personhood: Reflections from the First Year of a Supported Decision-Making Project, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 495
(2017); Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Amy T. Campbell, Supported Decision-Making: A
Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111 (2013).
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question of legality, what are the normative implications of such
involvement?
A. Dual Federalism No Longer
Debates among legal scholars about the legality of subnational
involvement in foreign affairs have a long history.106 But current consensus
suggests that, as a general rule, subnational entities are entitled to issue
policies that adhere to unratified international law instruments like the
CRPD. This consensus explains why in recent years cities and states have
complied with international agreements that the federal government has
shunned, including in the areas of climate policy,107 gender equality and
women’s rights,108 and immigration.109
Two core premises—one
constitutional, the other normative—appear to underpin this still-developing
trend.
The Constitutional Premise. As Jean Galbraith explains, the Constitution
“bestows a cornucopia of foreign affairs powers upon the federal government
and explicitly limits the powers of the states.”110 Article I authorizes
106

107

108

109

110

See Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1622 (arguing that “it is no longer true, if it ever was, that the national
political branches prefer federal regulation of all (or even most) issues that can be characterized as
involving foreign relations.”); Young, supra note 15, at 167 (arguing against the Supreme Court’s
“attempt to define and police a subject matter boundary—here, ‘foreign’ versus ‘domestic’—that
is increasingly under pressure from forces of economic, technological, and political integration.”);
Galbraith, supra note 13, at 274 (discussing subnational involvement in the area of climate change
policy during the Trump Administration).
See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, Dozens of States Want to Keep America’s Broken Climate Promise, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/12/24-states-are-still-paristheyre-also-cutting-emissions/603250/ [https://perma.cc/C29K-D3JF] (showing how states have
committed themselves to Paris Accord principles); Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, Despite Trump, Many
Cities and States are Fighting Climate Change. Including Pittsburgh., WA. PO. (June 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/06/despite-trumppittsburghs-working-on-slowing-climate-change-so-are-many-other-cities-and-states/?nid
[https://perma.cc/H4BM-UVEF] (explaining how American cities pronounced their support for
the Paris climate accord).
See, e.g., Background, CITIES FOR CEDAW, http://citiesforcedaw.org/background/
[https://perma.cc/7XEX-5TRZ] (last visited May 21, 2022) (“Cities for CEDAW is a campaign
to protect the rights of women and girls by passing ordinances establishing the principles of
CEDAW in cities and towns across the United States.”).
See, e.g., Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, U.S. Cities Want to Join U.N. Migration Talks that Trump Boycotted,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:22 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/05/u-s-cities-wantto-join-u-n-migration-talks-that-trump-boycotted/ [https://perma.cc/9CPZ-EMT3] (“Cities in
the United States are petitioning for formal inclusion in a U.N. global compact on migration just
days after the White House withdrew from the accord.”).
Galbraith, supra note 20, at 2131; see also Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1619 (describing the “four
means” by which the Constitution bestows plenary, not exclusive, foreign affairs power to the
federal government).
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Congress to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to declare war, and
to raise and support an army.111 Article II installs the President as the
commander-in-chief of the military and empowers them to enter into treaties
on behalf of the United States.112 By contrast, Article I provides that states
cannot “enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” and it also
prohibits states from entering into war with foreign countries and entering
into international agreements with the approval of Congress.113
By the same token, the U.S. Supreme Court has on many occasions
interpreted the Constitution to grant the federal government what appears
to be exclusive authority over foreign affairs matters. In United States v.
Belmont, the Court stated that “[i]n respect of all international negotiations
and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines
disappear.”114 In United States v. Pink, the Court echoed this idea, affirming
that “[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in
the national government exclusively.”115 And in Zschernig v. Miller, the Court
invalidated an Oregon probate law because it had “more than ‘some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries . . . .’”116
That said, scholars have come to agree that the embedded dual
federalism principle in Belmont, Pink, and Zschernig—which holds illegal any
invasion by a subnational entity “into the field of foreign affairs which the
Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress”—is a red herring.117
Distinguishing between exclusive and plenary federal power is necessary to
demarcate where the federal government and subnational entities belong in
foreign affairs decision-making.118 A second part of this conundrum,
according to Galbraith, is that the Court’s doctrine “is not always a reliable
guide to practice in foreign relations law, because the Court’s interventions
are sporadic, discrete, and heavily limited by justiciability doctrines” like

111
112
113

114
115
116
117
118

See U.S. Const. art. I.
See U.S. Const. art. II.
See U.S. Const. art. I. Glennon and Sloane explain that the Framers modeled these restrictions on
the Articles of Confederation. GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 17 (“Many of these
restrictions on state power were modeled on similar limits in the Articles of Confederation,
concerning, for example, prohibitions against engaging in war and entering into international
agreements without congressional approval.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
U. S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
Id. at 432 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941)); see, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1950).
See Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 1619.
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standing.119 The Constitution also does not provide a textual basis for the
federal government’s exclusivity over foreign affairs. As Michael Glennon
and Robert Sloane have suggested, “there are only the express prohibitions
and limitations in Article I, Section 10, and, arguably, others that should be
inferred.”120
Clearly, therefore, some cases do exist where subnational involvement
would pose a constitutional problem. As an easy example, Massachusetts
(where I reside) cannot enter into a bilateral treaty with Canada (where I was
born).121 But, in many if not most other cases, the constitutional problem
dissipates. On Glennon and Sloane’s account, the reasoning goes as follows:
Subnational entities possess great leeway in areas where the federal
government has not pronounced itself. And even when the federal
government has taken a stance, the assumption under current preemption
jurisprudence is that “states may still act unless Congress has clearly said
otherwise.”122
In this case then, where the Senate has declined to make the CRPD the
law of the land, subnational efforts to champion the Convention are not
susceptible to colorable constitutional challenges. For one, the expressive
policies that local and state governments have issued are immune to
challenge under current standing doctrine.123 Furthermore, SDM statutes
do not conflict with federal law because they either complement or replace
state guardianship statutes that come under the purview of the states’ police
power.124
119
120
121
122

123

124

Galbraith, supra note 20, at 2134.
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 87–88 (emphasis in original and internal footnote omitted).
See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty[.]”).
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 33; see also Ernest A. Young, Foreign Affairs Federalism in the
United States 259, 266, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019) (“To the extent that [adoptions of nonbinding international law]
do not bind U.S. entities internationally and are not preempted by affirmative federal legal
requirements, it is difficult to object on constitutional grounds.”).
For example, a hypothetical plaintiff challenging a state-passed resolution would most likely have
no means to prove an injury in fact, which is one of the three standing requirements in federal
court. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (“Injury in fact is a
constitutional requirement, and ‘[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing
requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have
standing.’”) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820, n.3 (1997)).
See Jennifer J. Monthie, The Myth Of Liberty And Justice For All: Guardianship In New York State, 80 ALB.
L. REV. 947, 949 (2017) (“Guardianship is a state’s termination of an individual’s legal status or
personhood under the law.”); Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who from What, and Why, and How?: A
Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53, 58 (2004) (“In the
United States, the nature and extent of probate court jurisdiction is determined on a statutory basis
by each state.”).
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The Normative Premise. Scholars have also argued that subnational
involvement in foreign affairs policy is normatively desirable.125 One part of
this argument is that cities and states have increasingly succumbed and, in
turn, responded to the pressures of globalization—what Yishai Blank defines
as the “dissemination, transmission, and dispersal of goods, persons, images,
and ideas across national boundaries”126—which increases their stakes in
transnational developments.127 Furthermore, as Glennon and Sloane have
suggested, “the conflicting incentives and trends generated by
globalization—at once local and global—partially explain the paralysis that
increasingly characterizes the federal government’s efforts (or lack thereof )
to resolve the problems caused by globalization.”128
Another part of the argument is that subnational entities have deep
interests in internalizing certain transnational norms in general and human
rights standards in particular. According to a study by Columbia Law
School’s Human Rights Institute, local and state officials have suggested that
human rights “empowers and elevates public service by affirming the
essential connection between government actors and the constituents they
serve and accentuating the human values that motivate public service.”129
“Localizing human rights,” to borrow Gaby Oré Aguilar’s phrase, thus
becomes a vehicle through which subnational entities can find a voice in a
space traditionally dominated by national governments and non-local
institutions like the U.N. and other nongovernmental organizations.130 As a
result, as Blank notes, “[o]ne of the most lucid manifestations of the
internalization of international norms and of global legal ideas” has occurred
locally rather than at the national level.131
Scholars are not unanimous about the utility of local internationalism, to
be sure. For example, Ryan Baasch and Saikrishna Prakash have argued
125

126
127
128
129

130

131

Glennon and Sloane identify three factors that account for this phenomenon. See GLENNON &
SLOANE, supra note 15, at 35–60 (identifying globalization, federal incapacity, and state capacity as
three driving factors for local internationalism prominence).
Blank, supra note 10, at 882.
See Galbraith, supra note 20, at 2134 (“[T]he increasingly transnational nature of our society has
done much more than raise the likelihood of state and local involvement in transnational issues.”).
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 38.
COLUM. L. SCH., HUM. RTS. INST., BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: HOW STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN USE HUMAN RIGHTS TO ADVANCE LOCAL POLICY 5 (2012),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/
Bringing%20Human%20Rights%20Home.pdf [https://perma.cc/43C3-3GGS].
See generally Gaby Oré Aguilar, The Local Relevance of Human Rights: A Methodological Approach, in THE
LOCAL RELEVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND
MANAGEMENT (Koen De Feyter et al. eds., 2011).
Blank, supra note 10, at 922.
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“that the supposed benefits of many voices in foreign affairs are illusory.”132
But, to date, this position has not gained much traction. One critique is that
it cherry-picks disadvantages rather than making a comprehensive benefitcost assessment. Local internationalism, and the tension-filled interactions
between subnational entities and the federal government it provokes, are
fluid and multifaceted:
These interactions are often cooperative ones, with one or both political
branches of the federal government providing support for the state or local
action through expressions of approval, the provision of funds, or regulatory
delegations. At other times, the interactions are far less amiable, involving
disagreement between levels of government about particular policies or
resistance by state and local governments to federal pressure to undertake
certain actions.133

On this account, local internationalism is not necessarily desirable
because it brings about optimal policymaking. As Baasch and Prakash have
pointed out, local and state governments are not immune to diplomacy
failures.134 Its desirability lies instead in its dynamism: the constant dueling
between cooperative and uncooperative foreign affairs federalism that has
elevated subnational entities from observer to participant in areas of
international concern.135 In the area of disability policy, this dynamism has
concretized in the form of both government initiatives in favor of the CRPD
and SDM statutes. Furthermore, and more conceptually, it has gradually
emerged from an ethos of foreign affairs federalism that invites, or perhaps
depends on, a practice of local internationalism that is at once “spontaneous”
and responsive to local needs.136 As Judith Resnik puts it, “American
federalism has served as a major route through which ‘foreign’ law becomes
domesticated.”137

132

133
134

135

136
137

See Baasch & Prakash, supra note 15, at 52. The authors, in fact, continue by stating that “[t]he
states should stand deaf and mute in the foreign arena because they lack the expertise and
knowledge necessary to engage in that arena.” Id. at 50.
Galbraith, supra note 20, at 2141.
See Baasch & Prakash, supra note 15, at 48–49, n.5 (listing numerous intrusions into foreign affairs
issues such as New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani expelling Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, from a concert at Lincoln Center, and New York and New
Jersey refusing to allow Soviet emissaries to land in their airports during the Cold War).
I must here acknowledge the depth of scholarship on cooperative and uncooperative foreign affairs
federalism that have informed this Article. See generally Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18;
Galbraith, supra note 13; Galbraith, supra note 20; Jonathan Remy Nash, Doubly Uncooperative
Federalism and the Challenge of U.S. Treaty Compliance, 55 COL. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 3 (2016); Judith
Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light
of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31 (2007).
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 76.
Resnik, supra note 135, at 34.
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B. Uncooperative Expressions of Subnational Support
I now turn to an exploration of how foreign affairs federalism has enabled
subnational entities to champion the CRPD here at home. I first provide
examples of local and state governments affirming their support for the
CRPD through resolutions and other policy initiatives. I then argue that
when subnational entities champion unratified treaties through such policies,
expressivism serves as a compelling framework for understanding their
significance.
1. Examples
Local and state support for the CRPD has consistently clashed with the
federal government’s stance on ratification. Expressive policies on the part
of local and state governments have become at once symbolic gestures of
commitment and concrete means to denounce federal opposition to
ratification.138 They are, as a result, canonical illustrations of uncooperative
federalism—what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have
described as subnational efforts “to contest and alter national policy.”139

138

According to Johnathan Nash, the types of subnational initiatives described in this sub-Part would
fall squarely under the category of uncooperative foreign affairs federalism. Nash, supra note 135,
at 12 (describing the “[t]ypology of federal and state government actions with respect to a treaty
regime”). In fact, for the reader’s convenience, I replicate here the visual matrix created by Nash
that typifies subnational involvement in areas traditionally governed by international treaties like
the CRPD:
State
Federal

Dissonant

Consonant

139

Dissonant
1. No ratified treaty; no
voluntarystate compliance.
Result: Nocompliance

Consonant
2. Uncooperative Federalism:
No ratified treaty; state
voluntarily
acts in line with treaty.
Result: State over-compliance

3. Doubly Uncooperative
Federalism:
Ratified treaty; state acts
inconsistently with treaty.
Result: State undercompliance

4. Cooperative Federalism:
Ratified treaty; state acts
to ensure compliance.
Result: Full compliance.

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18, at 1272.
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a. Local Governments
California. Cities and at least one county in California were at the
forefront of efforts to support the CRPD. In 2007, San Francisco’s Board of
Supervisors passed a resolution affirming the city’s support for the treaty.140
It requested “that President George W. Bush allow the United States to join
the group of nations” that had ratified the Convention.141 The resolution
also noted, and denounced, the Bush Administration’s opposition to the
CRPD.142
The Berkeley City Council also issued a resolution in 2007 endorsing the
CRPD.143 The resolution authorized the mayor to affirm the city’s support
to the U.N. Secretary-General and the Acting U.S. Representative to the
U.N. while urging the Senate to ratify the CRPD.144 The city’s Peace and
Justice Commission even established a Subcommittee on the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, tasked “to support the Convention,
and to strengthen communications about disability rights among
governments, academic institutions, and civil societies around the world.”145
The Commission then urged the mayor to once again adopt a resolution
calling on the Senate to ratify the CRPD.146
Still in 2007, the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Cruz issued
a resolution supporting ratification.147 Much like what San Francisco did,
the Board’s resolution required its Chairperson to affirm the County’s
140

141
142

143

144
145

146

147

Cal. Resolution 2007-01 In Support of the Historic UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
S.F. MAYOR’S DISABILITY COUNCIL (Apr. 20, 2007), https://sfgov.org/sfmdc/resolution-200701-support-historic-un-convention-rights-persons-disabilities [https://perma.cc/3LKE-GDQR].
Id.
See id. (“[I]n a departure from the United States’ historic role as an international leader in disability
and human rights, President George W. Bush has indicated that he will not sign this landmark
human rights treaty, which may in turn discourage other countries from signing it.”).
Cal. Resolution No 63,752—N.S., Supporting the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Adopting such Convention as City Policy, BERKELEY CITY COUNCIL (June 26, 2007),
https://www.cityofberkeley.info/citycouncil/resos/2007/63752.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG4LGDNA].
Id.
Peace & Justice Commission Subcommittee on Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, CITY OF
BERKELEY PEACE & JUST. COMM. (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.cityofberkeley.info/
uploadedFiles/Health_Human_Services/CRPD agenda revised 9-27-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8577-PZTC].
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, CITY OF BERKELEY PEACE & JUST. COMM. (Sept.
15, 2015), https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Clerk/City_Council/2015/09_Sep/Documents/
2015-09-15_Item_37_Convention_on_the_Rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/SVH8-XJWF].
Resolution Supporting the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, CNTY. OF SANTA
CRUZ (Aug. 3, 2007), https://sccounty01.co.santa-cruz.ca.us/BDS/Govstream2/Bdsvdata/
non_legacy_2.0/Minutes/2007/20070814-390/PDF/017.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD35-7Q2M].
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support to the U.N. Secretary-General and the Acting U.S. Representative
to the U.N.148
Then, in 2016, the mayor of Oakland took her turn to affirm the city’s
support for the CRPD, writing a letter to Senators Bob Corker (R-Tenn.)
and Ben Cardin (D-Md.), then respectively the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the SCFR.149 The letter emphasized Oakland’s strong support
for people with disabilities and urged the “Committee to bring the CRPD to
the [Senate] floor immediately to be considered and voted on by the full
Senate of the United States.”150
Florida. Cities and the largest county in Florida were also active in
supporting the CRPD. In 2016, Miami-Dade County’s Board of County
Commissioners adopted a resolution declaring its commitment to inclusion
for people with disabilities.151 In its resolution, the Board cited directly to
Article 3 of the CRPD and expressed dedication “to further promote
inclusionary practices and accommodations throughout Miami-Dade
County.”152
The same year, the City of Miami Beach issued a similar resolution that
praised the CRPD’s “support and commitment to the principles of inclusion
for individuals with special needs and disabilities.”153 Miami Beach’s mayor
and the City Commission also urged “national, state, and local governments
to express their commitment to the principles of inclusion and to continue
expanding services to children and adults with special needs and
disabilities.”154
And in 2019, the mayor of Coral Gables signed a resolution similar to
those of Miami-Dade County and Miami Beach.155 Invoking the
148
149

150
151

152
153
154
155

Id.
See generally Mayor’s Commission on Persons with Disabilities, CITY OF OAKLAND (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/pwa/documents/agenda/oak061045.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DNZ-HYKU].
Id.
Resolution Declaring Miami-Dade County’s Commitment to the Principles of Inclusion for Individuals with
Disabilities, Including Autism and other Special Needs, MIAMI-DADE CNTY. (July 6, 2016),
http://www.miamidade.gov/govaction/legistarfiles/Matters/Y2016/161226.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7V39-MVSU].
Id. (“[T]his Board supports the principles identified by the Convention and is dedicated to further
promote inclusionary practices and accommodations throughout Miami-Dade County.”).
R. No. 2016-29572, MIAMI BEACH, FLA. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://docmgmt.miamibeachfl.
gov/WebLink/DocView.aspx?id=245067&undefined&cr=1 [https://perma.cc/7XXV-BXD7].
Id.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Transition Plan, CITY OF CORAL GABLES (July 2019),
https://www.coralgables.com/media/Labor%20Relations/ADA/2019%20ADA%20Transition
%20Plan%20Update%20with%20Exhibits.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2EG-DCEL].
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Convention, it expressed support for “principles of inclusion for individuals
with autism and other special needs” and urged “action by national, state,
and local governments, businesses, and residential communities consistent
with these principles.”156
Others. Cities and at least one county outside of California and Florida
also issued resolutions supportive of the CRPD. The Chicago City Council
adopted in 2007 a resolution affirming the city’s commitment to Convention
principles and urged the Senate to ratify the Convention.157 The Council
also mandated that copies be provided to the U.N. Secretary-General and
the Deputy Permanent United States Representative to the U.N. “as a sign
of Chicago’s commitment to the importance of the issues raised in the
treaty.”158
The Board of County Commissioners of Multnomah County, Oregon—
the seat of which is Portland—also resolved to support the CRPD in 2007,159
declaring “it is in the best interests of the entire county to support the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.”160 Similar
to the Chicago example, the Board set out to communicate the county’s
support to the U.N. Secretary-General and the Deputy Permanent United
States Representative to the U.N.161
And years later, on International Day of Persons with Disabilities 2016,
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio affirmed its “commitment to ensuring
every person can access the tools they need to live a full, productive and
happy life.”162 He noted that New Yorkers wished to take the opportunity
“to honor the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and look forward to celebrating the day
it is ratified in the U.S.”163

156
157

158
159

160
161
162

163

Id.
See generally Chicago City Council Passes Resolution Urging U.S. to Sign on to Treaty on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, CITY OF CHICAGO MAYOR’S OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://old.g3ict.org/press/press_releases/press_release/p/id_40 [https://perma.cc/PKB3JH9E].
Id.
Resolution No. 07-185 Supporting the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
MULTNOMAH CNTY. (Dec. 6, 2007), https://multco.us/file/13621/download [https://perma.cc
/FS4P-YZ84].
Id.
Id.
Statement from Mayor Bill de Blasio on International Day of Persons with Disabilities, N.Y.C. (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/921-16/statement-mayor-bill-de-blasiointernational-day-persons-disabilities [https://perma.cc/Q7XA-U3R9].
Id.
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b. States
Hawaii. On three occasions, the Hawaii state legislature affirmed the
state’s support for the CRPD. In 2010, Hawaii’s House of Representatives
and Senate issued a joint resolution urging the federal government to ratify
the CRPD.164 One year later, Hawaii reignited its advocacy, this time
explicitly criticizing the federal government’s sluggishness in taking up the
Convention for consideration.165 And finally, in 2013, the legislature once
again issued a joint resolution urging the Senate to ratify the CRPD and
certified copies of the resolution to U.N. and federal government officials.166
Puerto Rico. The Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico amended a law in
2012 authorizing the appropriation of money for scholarships to families
with children in elementary and middle school. The Puerto Rico legislature
tailored the amendment to expand “the personal, professional, and labor
horizons of people with special needs or with disabilities.”167 It explicitly
invoked the CRPD’s recognition that “due to their lack of accessibility to
basic services and to the development of their aspirations [people with
disabilities] do not enjoy the same opportunities as other persons.”168 The
Legislative Assembly declared full support for the Convention and found it
“necessary to establish a special scholarship for students with disabilities or
special conditions who attend self-contained classrooms.”169
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Senate designated December 3, 2013, as
International Day of Persons with Disabilities. The state senators
acknowledged that “the international disability movement achieved an
extraordinary advance in 2006” when the CRPD was adopted.170 And so,
in the Convention’s spirit, the Senate resolved “to raise awareness of the goal
of full and equal enjoyment of human rights and participation in society by
persons with disabilities.”171
New Jersey. The General Assembly and Senate of New Jersey issued
identical resolutions in 2014 describing the Convention as “a vital
framework for creating legislation and policies around the world that
164
165

166
167
168
169
170
171

See H. Con. Res. 76, 2010 Leg., 25th Sess. (Haw. 2010).
See H. Con. Res. 231, 2011 Leg., 26th Sess. (Haw. 2011) (“[A]lthough the United States is a
signatory to the Convention . . . , it has not yet undertaken legal rights and obligations contained
in the Convention.”).
See S. Con. Res. 157, 2013 Leg., 28th Sess. (Haw. 2013).
2012 PR S.B. 2005.
Id.
Id.
S. Res. 269, 2013 Leg. (Penn. 2013).
Id.
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embrace the rights and dignity of all persons with disabilities.”172 The
legislature denounced the federal government’s unwillingness to ratify the
CRPD “notwithstanding bipartisan support in Congress,” joining the chorus
of subnational entities imploring that the Convention be ratified.173 The
resolutions also required their transmission to the Senate’s majority and
minority leaders as well as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations.174
California. In 2019, the California legislature joined the U.N. General
Assembly in designating April 2 as World Autism Awareness Day.175 The
legislature cited the resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly,
which invoked in turn the CRPD’s commitment “that children with
disabilities should enjoy a full and decent life, in conditions that ensure
dignity, promote self-reliance, and ensure the full enjoyment of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children
without disabilities.”176
* * *
In short, cities, counties, and states across the country have affirmed their
support for the CRPD, with many forcefully denouncing the federal
government’s unwillingness to ratify the Convention. These initiatives came
from subnational governments that represent the interests of millions of
people with disabilities.177 But these numbers alone, although indicative of
the far-reaching subnational advocacy in favor of the CRPD, do not paint
the full picture. As I explain below, an expressive analysis of these initiatives
gives them more nuance, both from the standpoints of federalism and human
rights.

172
173
174
175
176
177

A. Res. 75, 2014 Leg., 216th Sess. (N.J. 2014); S. Res. 69, 2014 Leg., 216th Sess. (N.J. 2014).
Id.
Id.
A. Con. Res. 188, 2020 Leg. (Cal. 2020).
G.A. Res 62/139 (Dec. 18, 2007).
Well over one million people with disabilities reside in Hawaii, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico alone.
See generally YANG-TAN INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT AND DISABILITY AT THE CORNELL
UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL, 2017 DISABILITY STATUS REPORT HAWAII (2017); YANG-TAN
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT AND DISABILITY AT THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL,
2017 DISABILITY STATUS REPORT NEW JERSEY (2017); YANG-TAN INSTITUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT AND DISABILITY AT THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY ILR SCHOOL, 2017 DISABILITY
STATUS REPORT PUERTO RICO (2017).
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2. An Expressivist Analysis
What is expressivism? How does it help frame the efforts outlined above?
As a general definitional matter, expressivism is not concerned with the
prescriptive nature of law—for instance, the penalty associated with a crime
or the liability associated with a breach of contract.178 Rather, expressivism
dwells on how formal government actions can “influence social norms and
push them in the right direction.”179 It is, in other words, “a reminder that
the things done by government actors (legislators, executive officials, and
judges alike) are important for reasons apart from the ‘tangible’ effects that
those actions produce.”180
Resolutions are exemplary case studies to understand expressivism in
practice. Although resolutions are among many methods of expression that
subnational entities have used to champion the CRPD, they remain the most
commonly employed.181 This is why my focus here is on resolutions and not,
say, the City of Berkeley’s creation of a CRPD subcommittee or Puerto
Rico’s invocation of the CRPD in its amendment authorizing the
appropriation of scholarship money for children with disabilities. Other
initiatives, although not outside the scope of this discussion, do not present
as crisp of an exposition. 182

178

179

180

181

182

See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363,
1396 (2000) (“[E]xpressivists do not typically confine themselves to prescriptive meaning; they
typically claim that legal decisions have further meaning, beyond what these decisions prescribe.”).
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026 (1996). Along
these lines, Richard McAdams offers a useful taxonomy of expressive theories that legal scholars
have used to understand the meaning or symbolism of law in society. RICHARD H. MCADAMS,
THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 13–16 (2014) (demarcating four
expressive theories that focus differently on its effects, political dimensions, and normative
implications, both from a legal and behavioral standpoint).
Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule, 33 LOY. L. A.
L. REV. 1309, 1317 (2000); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 943 (showing the government’s role in shaping social orthodoxy through non-prescriptive
means); Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 77 (2007) (analyzing expressive theory in the context of international law).
Others forms of expression in support of the CRPD include the invocation of CRPD principles in
education legislation as Puerto Rico did in 2012 and the establishment of a CRPD subcommittee
as the City of Berkeley did in 2014. See supra notes 168 and 147.
I would, however, commend to the reader not to discount the expressive value of those other
subnational initiatives because they serve also to champion the CRPD in important, yet intangible
ways. As late as January 25, 2021, the City of Berkeley’s Peace and Justice Commission affirmed
its support for the CRPD, noting in its 2019–2020 work plan that the Subcommittee on the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has held “held public forums on the issue in
the spring of 2018 and 2019.” Peace & Justice Commission Meeting Agenda, PEACE AND JUSTICE
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines a resolution as “the adoption of a motion,
the subject-matter of which would not properly constitute a statute; such as a
mere expression of opinion . . . .”183 Unlike an ordinance or a statute, a resolution
is not binding, and as such it is no more than a formal method of
communication that governments can use to take a position on a question of
policy. In this light, I suggest that resolutions serve two different but
interrelated expressive purposes. The first, which I will call the “aspirational
purpose,” is to signal as widely as possible a commitment to disability justice
and human rights. The second is what I will call the “federalist purpose”—
the effort to affirm subnational autonomy in the face of federal inaction.
The Aspirational Purpose. Resolutions offer local and state governments the
opportunity to proclaim their support for the crucial but often elusive human
rights cause.184 Writing in the context of subnational entities pushing for the
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), which the federal government
signed in 1980 but has never brought to the Senate floor for a vote,185 Martha
Davis has described resolutions as a way “to associate with a global human
rights movement rather than establish normative legal baselines at the local
level.”186
From this perspective, resolutions are not necessarily meant to create
“socially desirable processes or outcomes.”187 Rather, they have an
“outward” purpose of affirming support for the global human rights
struggle.188 They aim, as Davis puts it, to “establish and strengthen
horizontal relationships with other governmental and nongovernmental

183
184

185

186
187
188

COMMISSION (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.cityofberkeley.info/uploadedFiles/Clerk/Level_3__Commissions/Agenda-Packet-PJC-20210125(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/56Q8-KD46] (emphasis
added).
What is RESOLUTION?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/resolution/
[https://perma.cc/5MQC-F756] (last visited May 21, 2022).
See Anthony J. Langlois, The Elusive Ontology of Human Rights, 18 GLOBAL SOC’Y 243, 260 (2004)
(“[T]he assimilation of human rights to those measures taken by states to institutionalise human
rights reduces and even extinguishes the capacity to claim human rights. In order for us to have
human rights, human rights must be more than positive law.”).
See A Fact Sheet on CEDAW: Treaty for the Rights of Women, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 25, 2005),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/pdfs/cedaw_fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4VNDU24]; see also S. REP. NO. 107-9 (2002).
Martha F. Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnational Incorporation of International Human Rights Law at the
End of an Era, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 422 (2008).
Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in
Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 88 (2007).
Davis, supra note 186, at 418 (2008).
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entities worldwide.”189 The aspirational purpose embodied by resolutions is
thus without boundaries: They are amicable gestures of solidarity that occur
in spite and not because of U.S.-centric policy tensions, and they reveal their
potentiality only when observed in concert with one another.
The Federalist Purpose. Resolutions also offer a time-tested mechanism for
subnational entities to reaffirm their role in the American system of
federalism. As Justice Anthony Kennedy noted in Cook v. Gralike, “when the
Constitution was enacted, respectful petitions to legislators were an accepted
mode of urging legislative action.”190 “From the earliest days of our Republic
to the present time,” Justice Kennedy continued, “States have done so in the
context of federal legislation.”191 And at least since the country declined to
ratify the CEDAW, local and state governments have extended this tradition
to the realm of treaty ratification.
Dave Fagundes has also observed that although “states have not used
their communicative abilities to check the federal government in the robust
way that the framers intended, they have taken a more modest role in this
respect, using legislative resolutions to urge and to criticize federal action.”192
Fagundes extended this observation to local governments, implying that
municipal and county resolutions can become ways for non-federal actors to
elbow their way into national policy discourse.193 But I would go one step
further and argue that resolutions promote certain federalist values that
acquire particular salience when the federal government refuses to join the
world in a specific human rights cause.
Consider first the principle of “tyranny prevention,” which describes how
local and state governments “can serve as and foster political counterweights
to the incumbent powers within the federal government.”194 What follows is
that subnational units “can be the voice of their citizens’ discontent” and use
their “political infrastructures to alert their citizens when the federal
government adopts policies inconsistent with their citizens’ preferences or
best interests.”195

189
190
191
192
193

194
195

Id. at 422.
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 529 (2001)
Id.
Dave Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637, 1686 (2006)
(footnotes omitted).
See id. (“[T]he expressive capacities of state and local governments may become a particularly
important way for these entities to assert their institutional identities and opinions vis-à-vis the
federal government.”) (emphasis added).
Cox, supra note 180, at 1324.
Id. at 1325.
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Subnational support for the CRPD, and particularly the resolutions
denouncing the federal government’s inaction like those issued by San
Francisco and Hawaii, are cases in point. They both call out the Senate’s
decision not to export American wisdom on disability law and policy
abroad.196 As such, they are acts of resistance, albeit “restrained,” which are
memorialized as part of the country’s broader history of subnational
opposition to federal policy.197
Consider then the principle of autonomy, which Bullman-Pozen and
Gerken describe as follows:
Autonomy prevents the federal government from quashing the opposition
or playing its lawmaking trump card. It creates zones of policymaking
independence where states can experiment and depart from federal norms.
It gives states the freedom to speak against an overweening federal
government. It even allows states to check the national government by
holding federal officials accountable for abusing their power.198

One plausible account under this view is that resolutions help demarcate
an area where local and state governments can make pronouncements on
issues traditionally dominated by the federal government. For instance, by
certifying resolution copies to U.N. officials, which cities (e.g., the City of
Berkeley) and states (e.g., New Jersey) have done, the intention is to create
alliances between subnational entities and important international players.
Local and state officials can then make their voices heard on issues of global
importance, and although the force of their voices pales in comparison to
those of sovereign nations, the mere act of taking a normative stance can
become a symbol of autonomy.
Resolutions are also politically efficient means of promoting perceptions
of subnational autonomy,199 and of attracting the support of ordinary

196

197
198
199

I think here specifically of an op-ed written by Daniel W. Drezner that puts this idea in far stronger,
and facetious, language:
Unlike Law of the Sea, not ratifying [the CRPD] doesn’t appreciably harm U.S. interests.
It does, however, make the United States look pretty dysfunctional. In essence, the U.S.
Senate just rejected a treaty on protecting the disabled that would have globalized the
status quo in U.S. law on this issue. To use the parlance of international relations scholars,
this is dumber than a bag of hammers.
Daniel W. Drezner, Praised Be the Glorious Sovereigntists who Protect the U.S.A. from . . . from . . . Wait,
What?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 5, 2012, 1:33 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/05/
praised-be-the-glorious-sovereigntists-who-protect-the-u-s-a-from-from-wait-what/
[https://perma.cc/X5A9-WTVD].
Id.
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18, at 1265 (footnote omitted).
See Cox, supra note 180, at 1329.
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citizens.200 According to Todd Pettys, if subnational units and the federal
government “are genuinely to compete for the people’s affection, each must
enjoy a broad measure of freedom to select those avenues by which it will try
to earn that affection . . . .”201 From this perspective, then, localities and
states will tend to exploit policy initiatives that not only show their
uniqueness as compared to other states, but that can also fill policy vacuums
left by federal inertia. This idea strongly applies here, where those who
support the CRPD will be more “affectionate” toward equally supportive
subnational entities than toward the less supportive federal government.
* * *
In short, expressivism offers a powerful framework for analyzing the utility
of subnational resolutions. For one, although resolutions appear to be no
more than “soft law”—international law parlance used to denote nonbinding yet normatively influential policy202—they are tools that local and
state governments have employed to proclaim support for the CRPD,
among other human rights treaties. They also buttress traditional principles
of federalism, specifically those of tyranny prevention and promotion of
subnational autonomy. This dual purpose, along with the amalgamation of
local and state promotion efforts outlined above, illustrate the strong support
that subnational entities have shown for the CRPD. But the Convention’s
influence on subnational policy does not stop there. States across the country
have enacted SDM statutes, materializing Article 12’s commitment to
recognizing “that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal
basis with others in all aspects of life.”203 These statutes thus offer a spacious
window through which to observe and appreciate foreign affairs federalism
in practice.

200
201
202

203

See generally, Todd E. Pettys, Competing for People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 329 (2003).
Id. at 359.
Of course, soft law is the subject of much definitional debates between international law scholars
in which I do not wish to partake. See, e.g., C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and
Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 850 (1989) (“There is a wide diversity in the
instruments of so-called soft law which makes the generic term a misleading simplification.”); A. E.
Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 901, 901–2
(1999) (discussing different features of soft law). My intention here is to pin resolutions within a
lexicon that is easily understood by the reader.
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Art. 12(2),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/ConventionRightsPersonsWithDisabiliti
es.aspx [https://perma.cc/J3GB-BU5J] (last visited May 21, 2022).
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III. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
It is frequently said that Article 12 of the CRPD is emblematic of the paradigm shift of
the Convention. I agree. And it is worth stating what that is before we proceed. It is the
deceptively simple proposition that persons with disabilities are “subjects” and not
“objects”—sentient beings like all others deserving equal respect and equal enjoyment of
their rights.
—Gerard Quinn204

As of this writing, at least eighteen states and the District of Columbia
have passed SDM laws, and several more remain in the legislative process.
SDM laws are meant “to empower persons with disabilities by providing
them with help in making their own decisions, rather than simply providing
someone to make decisions for them.”205 Although intuitive to many
disability advocates, this concept clashes with traditional systems of
guardianship, or substituted decision-making, in which people deemed
incompetent (i.e., wards) have to delegate decision-making to others (i.e.,
guardians).206
In this Part, I explore how certain stakeholders involved in the CRPD’s
negotiations, namely DPOs, envisioned SDM as being integral to the
Convention’s jurisprudence. I then turn to how American states came to
integrate SDM within their systems of law, focusing on the crucial role that
the federal government played in fueling and mobilizing disability advocacy
at the state level. Finally, I provide an overview of SDM law in the United
States, covering statutes that states have passed and case law that has
integrated Article 12 language in their reasoning. I conclude with the
observation that SDM laws serve as exemplars of cooperative foreign affairs
federalism.

204

205
206

Gerard Quinn, Personhood and Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of Article 12 CRPD 10
(HPOD Conf., Harv. L. Sch., Feb. 20, 2010), http://www.fedvol.ie/_fileupload/Research/
NDE%20Reading%20Lists/Harvard%20Legal%20Capacity%20gq%20draft%202%20Gerard
%20Quinn%20Feb%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RZ8-K8RA].
Kohn, Blumenthal, & Campbell, supra note 105, at 1113.
See, e.g., Arlene S. Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fight for Personhood, Legal Capacity, and Equal Recognition
Under Law for People with Disabilities in Israel and Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 558 (2017); Kristin
Booth Glen, Introducing A “New” Human Right: Learning from Others, Bringing Legal Capacity Home, 49
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018); Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “There’s Voices
in the Night Trying to Be Heard”: The Potential Impact of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
on Domestic Mental Disability Law, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 873, 898 (2019) (“A controversial topic
regarding the CRPD . . . is whether Article 12 completely abolishes guardianships.”).
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A. A Synthesis of Article 12’s Drafting History
Article 12 sets out the right to “[e]qual recognition before the law.”207 It
requires that nations “reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right to
recognition everywhere as persons before the law,”208 and that they
“recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal
basis with others in all aspects of life.”209 Seen in a different light, Article 12
attempts to codify what Jacobus tenBroek, one of the fathers of the American
disability rights movement,210 had envisioned a generation before the
CRPD’s passage: “a policy entitling the disabled to full participation in the
life of the community and encouraging and enabling them to do so.”211
Although Article 12 appears aspirational on its face, even a brief review
of its drafting history reveals contentious debates about its practical
applications. Captured by the treaty’s travaux préparatoires and a rich body of
scholarship,212 these debates centered on striking the right balance between
“concerns of protection” and “participation.”213 In essence, they boiled
down to one core question: Between guardianship and SDM, which is most
compatible with both protecting the “legal personality” and promoting the

207
208
209
210

211
212

213

CRPD, Art. 12.
CRPD, Art. 12(1).
CRPD, Art. 12(2).
See Stein & Lord, supra note 40, at 170 (2008) (“Within the disability rights realm, Professor
tenBroek made an early and significant contribution to the development of the social model of
disability, a civil rights paradigm from which most disability rights advocates, both domestically
and internationally, draw their arguments.”) (internal citations omitted).
Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
841, 843 (1966).
See, e.g., Nilsson & Series, supra note 26, at 34; Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights
Convention, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 429 (2006–2007); Nandini Devi, Jerome Bickenbach
& Gerold Stucki, Moving Towards Substituted or Supported Decision-Making? Article 12 of the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 5 EURO. J. DISABILITY RES. 249, 259–63 (2011) (overviewing
how the drafters negotiated Article 12); Tara J. Melish, An Eye Toward Effective Enforcement: A
Technical-Comparative Approach to the CRPD Negotiations, HUM. RTS. & DISABILITY ADVOC., 70, 84–
88 (2013) (explaining Disability Rights International’s involvement in Article 12’s negotiation
process). The United Nations has also kept up to date the records spanning from the First Session
to the Eighth Session of the CRPD’s negotiations. See Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities,
U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFS., https://www.un.org/development/desa/
disabilities/resources/ad-hoc-committee-on-a-comprehensive-and-integral-internationalconvention-on-the-protection-and-promotion-of-the-rights-and-dignity-of-persons-withdisabilities.html [https://perma.cc/RDH2-2VX7] (last visited May 21, 2022).
Dhanda, supra note 212, at 438.
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“legal capacity” of people with disabilities?214 Throughout the CRPD’s
negotiations, which spanned eight sessions of an Ad Hoc Committee
between 2002 and 2006, this question divided the Convention’s drafters.215
And although a comprehensive exposition of the process would defy the
scope of this work, I nevertheless extract some key insights here.
On one side of the debate were many nations that advocated for a
conception of equal recognition that allowed for guardianship. For example,
in an early foundational draft crafted in 2003 during a regional workshop in
Bangkok, guardianship was the chosen model for regulating the
administration of property. Article 25 stated that “[w]here a person with
intellectual disability is not able to exercise this right, the legal guardian of
that person shall be entitled to exercise the right on behalf of, and in the
interests of, that person.”216 In another draft submitted by representatives
from India, guardianship also appeared in the context of protecting the right
to work and social security.217 With these drafts thus re-emerged the
assumption that certain people with disabilities, particularly those with
mental and psychosocial disabilities, lack the ability to make decisions for
themselves. This assumption has a long history, from the time of Cicero
through the medieval period and right up to modern times.218 In Ancient
Rome, guardianship laws empowered the state to limit the decision-making
capacity of people considered “incompetent,” including slaves, women,
children, and foreigners.219 Still today, countries in all populated continents
214

215
216

217

218

219

Nilsson and Series define legal personality as “the ability to bear rights and duties under law” and
legal capacity as “whether and how one can exercise, claim, or defend those rights.” Nilsson &
Series, supra note 26, at 340.
Id. at 343.
Chair’s Draft Elements of a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on Protection and Promotion of
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE (Dec. 2003),
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-chair1.htm [https://perma.cc/2FJ9AUAE].
Draft Convention–India, U.N. ENABLE, https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontribindia.htm [https://perma.cc/V94A-ZMNU] (last visited May 21, 2022) (encouraging financial
institutions to support the self-employment of “parents/guardians” and ensuring that people with
disabilities have “access to legal guardianship for the protection of their person as well as of their
property”).
Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 MO. L. REV. 215,
218–19 (1975) (discussing the history of guardianship while focusing the historical analysis on
medieval England).
See ARLENE S. KANTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: FROM CHARITY TO HUMAN RIGHTS 238–39 (2015) (discussing the origins of guardianship
laws); see also Arlene S. Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fight for Personhood, Legal Capacity, and Equal
Recognition Under Law for People with Disabilities in Israel and Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 561
(2017) (“Under Roman law, guardianship limited the legal capacity of slaves, women, children,
and foreign nationals.”).
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of the world have guardianship laws, while in the United States, all 50 states
and the District of Columbia have enacted such statutes.220
Nevertheless, despite the pervasiveness of guardianship laws at the time
of the negotiations, DPOs fervently opposed enshrining guardianship in the
treaty’s text. In their view, any textual recognition of guardianship would
contradict the right to self-determination that the Convention was designed
to protect and uphold. Inclusion International, for example, affirmed that
“traditional guardianship laws are used to control people’s lives and to deny
people the right to make decisions on their own behalf.”221 The World
Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry similarly held that
“[a]utonomy and self-determination are dependent on having sufficient
access to resources so that economic and social coercion do not lead to
decision-making that does not reflect the person’s own values and
feelings.”222
Although differences between both sides were palpable, not all was lost.
The working group, which the Ad Hoc Committee had convened during the
second session to produce a draft of the treaty, prepared a first version of the
CRPD that strategically blurred the distinction between guardianship and
SDM—a first step toward what Amita Dhanda has called a “variegated
approach” to the question of legal capacity.223 It laid out the general
principle that “persons with disabilities have full legal capacity on an equal
basis as others, including in financial matters . . . .”224 But it went a step
further, creating a safeguard mechanism where people with disabilities could
delegate decision-making to others, but only in specific circumstances.225
220
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222
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224

225

See
Guardianship,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.mindbank.info/search?
search_text=%22guardianship%22&page=1 [https://perma.cc/4YNX-ZSTG] (last visited May
21, 2022) (showing that countries like Japan, China, Sweden, United Kingdom, Canada, Finland,
Australia, Malta, and Uzbekistan all have guardianship laws); Leslie Salzman, Rethinking
Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandated of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 176 (2010).
Id.
Contribution by World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP), U.N. ENABLE (Dec. 30–31,
2003, & Jan. 5, 2004), https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-wnusp.htm
[https://perma.cc/F25P-NXG9].
See Dhanda, supra note 212, at 440.
Draft Article 9, Equal Recognition as a Person Before the Law, U.N. ENABLE,
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwgreporta9.htm [https://perma.cc/DCN84P7R] (May 21, 2022).
To this effect the text contained the following language:
States Parties shall[] ensure that where assistance is necessary to exercise that legal
capacity[,] the assistance is proportional to the degree of assistance required by the person
concerned and tailored to their circumstances, and does not interfere with the legal
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This provision gave nations substantial discretion in determining the correct
balance between promoting autonomy and preserving areas for substituted
decision-making. Because of this considerable discretion, however, DPOs
remained leery of the working group’s proposal. In a footnote to the draft,
they clarified “that where others are exercising legal capacity for a person
with disabilities, those decisions should not interfere with the rights and
freedoms of the person concerned.”226 According to Dhanda, that footnote
was textual proof of the latent tension between the negotiating coalitions—
an “opposition that had to be addressed before the final draft text for ‘legal
capacity’ in the Convention could be accepted.”227
From that point forward, the stakeholders continued to debate the merits
of guardianship versus SDM.228 Two years after the working group
submitted its first draft, the negotiations appeared to have reached a decisive
juncture. The European Union (E.U.), with the support of Canada,
Australia, Norway, Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, and the United States,
submitted a draft of Article 12 that tried to bring together “safeguards
required for guardianship with some of the standards desired for supported
decision-making.”229 One critical clause read as follows:
States Parties shall ensure that all legislative or other measures which relate
to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective
safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human rights
law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of
legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free
of conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to
the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are
subject to periodic impartial and independent judicial review. The

226
227
228

229

capacity, rights and freedoms of the person; [and] relevant decisions are taken only in
accordance with a procedure established by law and with the application of relevant legal
safeguards.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Dhanda, supra note 212, at 441.
As Nilsson and Series explain:
The records of the Ad Hoc Committee discussions show that early on many participating
states expressed confusion or disagreement about the meaning of ‘legal capacity’. Some
states distinguished between the ‘capacity to hold and bear rights’ and the ‘capacity to act’,
arguing that whilst the former could not be limited the latter could be. In part this
disagreement mirrored different understandings of legal capacity in the various legal
systems. This distinction was strongly opposed by the IDC, as the ‘capacity to act’ was
deemed vital for self-determination.
Nilsson & Series, supra note 26, at 345 (footnote omitted).
Dhanda, supra note 212, at 450.
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safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect
the person’s rights and interests.230

State representatives and DPOs heralded the E.U.-submitted draft as a
major step forward.231 Some advocates continued to advocate for a version
of Article 12 that allowed for guardianship “as a matter of last resort.”232 But
the model embraced by the draft had in all appearance won the day. In fact,
as the astute reader will notice, the final version of the CRPD contains only
a handful of minor divergences from the text provided above.
Although that version and the one currently enshrined in the CRPD
eschew explicit reference to SDM, it was an ambiguity necessary for
stakeholders to see the negotiations through.233 More importantly, it marked
the beginning of a new international understanding of legal capacity, which
the CRPD Committee itself recognized as “a shift from the substitute
decision-making paradigm to one that is based on [SDM].”234 But, as
Michael Stein has explained, “the scope and operation of legal capacity is
still a very controversial issue flowing from the CRPD . . . .”235 For example,
the Convention has not stopped countries across the world, including states
parties to the Convention, from operationalizing legal capacity through the
lens of guardianship.236 Yet a consensus among scholars, international
230

231

232

233

234

235
236

Contribution by Governments: European Union, U.N. ENABLE (Jan. 30, 2006),
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7eu.htm [https://perma.cc/ND3H-A7WK]
(setting forth the draft of Article 12 defined the European Union “together with Canada, Australia,
Norway, Costa Rica, USA, Liechtenstein”).
See Dhanda, supra note 212, at 450 (“A large number of States Parties expressed either full or
qualified support for [the E.U.-submitted draft]. Most importantly, a majority of the state parties
and the IDC saw in the modified text enough commonality that could help then to reach that
elusive consensus.”).
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE (2006),
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7ann2rep.htm#art12fn1
[https://perma.cc/Z3QB-DTW7].
Nilsson & Series, supra note 26, at 341 (“[I]t was ambiguity about whether article 12 permitted or
prohibited substitute decision-making that enabled states parties who could not envisage abolishing
systems of guardianship or deprivation of legal capacity to sign up to the Convention.”).
U.N. Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, art. 12, ¶ 1 (Apr.
11, 2014); Andrew Peterson, Jason Karlawish & Emily Largent, Supported Decision Making With People
at the Margins of Autonomy, AM. J. BIOETHICS 4 (2020) (explaining that Article 12 “is widely regarded
as a touchstone for supported decision making”). See also generally Benjamin A. Barsky, Julie Hannah
& Dainius Pūras, Redefining International Mental Health Care in the Wake of the COVID-19 Pandemic, in
MENTAL HEALTH, LEGAL CAPACITY, & HUMAN RIGHTS 244 (Michael Ashley Stein et al. eds.,
2021).
Michael Ashley Stein, China and Disability Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 7, 19 (2010).
To this effect, Stein has observed that the scope of legal capacity remains the “topic on which the
majority of reservations have been made by States when ratifying” the CRPD. Id. at 19; see also
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
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policymakers, and advocates has coalesced around the idea that the
negotiations surrounding Article 12 were necessary preconditions for the
growing recognition of SDM across the world, including in Bulgaria,
Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and—as I explain below—the United
States.237
B. SDM in the United States
The U.S. adoption of SDM is curious considering the Senate’s decision
not to ratify the CRPD. For example, Eliana Theodorou has warned
“against overstating the salience of international human rights law in
accounting for interest in [SDM] in the United States.”238 By contrast,
others could claim that the CRPD was the sole causal impetus for state SDM
laws, which would buttress the idea advanced by Glennon and Sloane that
subnational entities have an active role in supporting innovations stemming
from international developments.
The answer, in my view, is not clear-cut. But strong evidence suggests
that the CRPD was a necessary but not sufficient catalyst in bringing about
SDM laws in several states. As I show below, the SDM movement in the
United States has occurred against a backdrop of financial and research
support from national entities, including the U.S. Administration for
Community Living (“ACL”) and the American Bar Association (“ABA”),
both of which have a strong record of support for the CRPD. This

237

238

chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-15&src=IND
[https://perma.cc/8HFB-Q766]
(last
visited May 21, 2022) (showing that at least Australia, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, and
Norway have made reservations concerning the use of substituted decision-making practices).
Guardianship laws in other countries have also attracted the attention of disability right advocates
because of high-profile lawsuits in European courts. See, e.g., Shtukaturov v. Russia (App. No.
44009/05), Eur. Ct. H.R. 90 (2008); Alajos Kiss v. Hungary (App. No. 38832/06), Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010); Stanev v. Bulgaria (App. No. 36760/06), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); Sykora v. The Czech
Republic (App. No. 23419/07), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012).
See generally Catalina Devandas Aguilar (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/37/56, at ¶ 41 (Dec. 12, 2017) (“Several countries have also introduced recognition
of supported decision-making regimes into their legislation.”); The Right to Make Choices: International
Laws and Decision-Making by People with Disabilities, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK,
http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/asan-toolkit-right-to-makechoices.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FXG-STUE] (last visited May 21, 2022). For a small sample of
scholarship that details the relationship between the CRPD and SDM law, see generally Nandini
Devi, Supported Decision-Making and Personal Autonomy for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, J. L. MED. ETHICS 792 (2013); Kohn,
Blumenthal, & Campbell, supra note 105.
Eliana J. Theodorou, Supported Decision-Making in the Lone-Star State, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 978
(2018).
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particularity—that is, the dynamic role that these national entities have
played in prompting state action on the issue of SDM—is thus important for
understanding the interplay between foreign affairs federalism and Article
12’s implementation on American soil.
1. Planting the SDM Seed
In October 2012, two months before the Senate voted against the CRPD,
disability rights advocates and organizations held a roundtable in New York
City “to discuss the rights of people with intellectual disabilities to make their
own decisions, including the impact of the [CRPD].”239 Organized by the
ABA and a sub-agency of the ACL, the meeting entitled Beyond Guardianship:
Supported Decision-Making by Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities had one goal:
“to explore concrete ways to move from a model of substituted decisionmaking, like guardianship, to one of supported decision-making, consistent
with the human right of legal capacity.”240
Scholars have described this roundtable as a turning point,241 including
Judge Kristin Booth Glen who observed that the meeting was an
acknowledgment of “the need for some central entity to gather and
disseminate information on SDM.”242 Until then, efforts to promote
autonomous decision-making among persons with disabilities had occurred
haphazardly. Researchers during the 1990s had tried to find ways to
promote self-determination for youth, in part because they had not achieved

239
240
241

242

Roundtable, supra note 27.
Id.
See Glen, supra note 106, at 501 (“Perhaps the first major meeting in the United States specifically
directed at legal capacity and SDM was [the] interdisciplinary roundtable held in New York City
in 2012.”); Peter Blanck & Jonathan G. Martinis, “The Right to Make Choices”: The National Resource
Center for Supported Decision-Making, 3 AM. ASS’N ON INT. & DEV. DISABILITIES 24, 27 (2015) (making
clear that the roundtable was one of the earliest concerted efforts to advocate broadly for SDM in
the United States); Dilip V. Jeste et al., Supported Decision Making in Serious Mental Illness, 81
PSYCHIATRY 28, 33 (listing the 2012 roundtable as an important development regarding SDM
policy in the United States); Dohn Hoyle, Reflections on Autonomy, THE ARC (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://arcmi.org/resource-center/documents/reflections-on-autonomy/
[https://perma.cc/A433-35NH] (explaining that the roundtable “meeting was not only
affirmation that a number of people had moved ‘beyond guardianship’ but were also committed
to doing something about it.”); Resolution, Am. Bar Ass’n 10 (Aug. 2017),
https://health.ucdavis.edu/mindinstitute/centers/cedd/pdf/sdm-aba-resolution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8D6V-LKJZ] (describing the roundtable as the first of its kind on a national
scale).
Glen, supra note 106, at 501.
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similar economic and social outcomes as their peers without disabilities.243
Later, in 2009, the Texas legislature created “a pilot program to promote
the provision of supported decision-making services to persons with
intellectual and developmental disabilities and persons with other cognitive
disabilities who live in the community.”244 But, according to Glen, the Texas
pilot program had produced disappointing results, and on the whole, selfdetermination policies until the 2012 roundtable had lacked the type of
unified, human rights-oriented vision that the CRPD had inspired.245
The roundtable was also a way to form consensus around the failures of
guardianship as a way of protecting the interests of people with disabilities.246
One argument was that guardianship arrangements had become overused
and misapplied, too often usurping the principle that they should be
“designed as a last resort, applied only when an individual lacks capacity to
make decisions.”247 Another problem was that plenary guardianship
orders—where guardians have full decision-making capacity over their
wards—were far more common than limited guardianship orders.248
According to a national survey conducted by Pamela Teaster and her
colleagues, “there were eleven times more plenary than limited
guardianships of property and four times more plenary than limited
guardianships of the person.”249 Guardianship orders had in effect become
blunt instruments that judges would employ reflexively and with little regard
to the needs of the wards.
A second argument was that guardianship routinely led wards to feelings
of isolation, helplessness, and loneliness.250 These effects undermined the
243

244
245
246

247
248

249
250

See, e.g., Janis Chadsey Rusch, Frank R. Rusch & Mark F. O’Reilly, Transition from School to Integrated
Communities, 12 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 23 (1991); Michael Wehmeyer & Michelle Schwartz,
Self-Determination and Positive Adult Outcomes: A Follow-Up Study of Youth with Mental Retardation or Learning
Disabilities, 63 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 245 (1997).
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 531.02446 (2009) (expired on Sept. 1, 2013).
Glen, supra note 106, at 508 n.75 (“Although [the pilot program] was able to educate and train a
number of volunteers on the principles of SDM, it only established one [SDM agreement].”).
See Roundtable, supra note 27 (“The Roundtable included conversation about legal and other
reforms needed in this country around decision-making, and changes that might lead to the end of
guardianship as we know it today.”).
Kohn, Blumenthal & Campbell, supra note 105, at 1117.
See Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 347, 354 (1998) (“Plenary guardianship continues to be used despite the statutory alternative
of limited guardianship.”).
Pamela B. Teaster et al., Wards of the State: A National Study of Public Guardianship, 37 STETSON L.
REV. 193, 233 (2007).
See Kohn, Blumenthal & Campbell, supra note 105, at 1119–1120 (summarizing studies that
indicated that guardianship leads to isolation loneliness and contributes to undermining “wards’
physical and psychological well-being by reducing their sense of control over their own lives.”).
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idea that guardianship operated in favor of wards’ best interests, and they
raised the concern that the initiation of guardianship was in no way tethered
to benevolence and concern. Jennifer Wright found to this effect that “the
overwhelming majority of guardianships are initiated by someone other than
the proposed ward,” serving the needs of other, often uninvolved parties.251
A third argument was that guardianship ran the risk of contravening Title II
of the ADA and its community integration mandate, which Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg famously elucidated in Olmstead v. L.C.252 By curtailing
someone’s right to decision-making, the argument goes, the state fails to
account for less restrictive alternatives like SDM arrangements,
presumptively violating the ADA.253
On these views, the upshot of the 2012 roundtable was the need to
formalize a path forward for the development of nationwide SDM efforts.254
The ACL took the lead by creating a grant in 2014 for the creation of a “firstof-its-kind” hub called the National Resource Center for Supported
Decision-Making (“NRC-SDM”), which aimed to conduct and disseminate

251
252

253

254

Jennifer L. Wright, Guardianship for Your Own Good: Improving the Well-Being of Respondents and Wards in
the USA, 33 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 350, 353 (2010).
See generally Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of
the Integration Mandated of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010).
The ADA’s community inclusion mandate requires states to forego institutional treatment only
“when the State’s treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the
affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably
accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others
with mental disabilities.” Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination of people with disabilities in areas of state and
government services, providing that people with disabilities cannot “be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990). As Salzman explains, “when the
state appoints a guardian and restricts an individual from making his or her own decisions, the
individual loses crucial opportunities for interacting with others.” Salzman, supra note 252, at 194.
Guardianship thus results in a type of segregation “that parallels the isolation of institutional
confinement,” violating Title II’s integration mandate as interpreted in Olmstead. Id.
The roundtable also occurred a few months both the case of Margaret “Jenny” Hatch made
national headlines. Called a “hero to the disabled,” Ms. Hatch defeated in Virginia state court an
attempt to being placed under plenary guardianship. Theresa Vargas, Virginia Woman with Down
Syndrome
Becomes
Hero
to
the
Disabled,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
17,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-woman-with-down-syndrome-becomes-heroto-the-disabled/2013/08/17/0da21766-062e-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html
[https://perma.cc/N4DA-SHQ7]. Ms. Hatch’s case inspired the creation of the Jenny Hatch
Justice Project, which continues to valiantly advocate for self-determination for people with
disabilities. See generally THE JENNY HATCH JUSTICE PROJECT, http://www.jennyhatchjustice
project.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZEZ2-SMJ5] (last visited May 21, 2022).
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research on the benefits of SDM as widely as possible.255 The grant also
required the NRC-SDM to allocate funding awards for “state-based projects
designed to increase knowledge of and access to [SDM] by older adults and
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.”256 According to the
NRC-SDM, projects in fourteen different states have benefited from grants,
many of which have since enacted SDM laws, including Delaware, Maine,
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Nevada.257
Against this backdrop, two findings start coming into focus. First,
although scholars have linked the CRPD with the U.S. SDM movement,
they have largely avoided drawing a clear causal pathway between these two
phenomena. The historical developments outlined above provide a starting
point from which to begin this endeavor. (I do recognize, however, that the
history behind the Texas SDM statute, which Theodorou aptly documents,
undermines any claim that the CRPD was the sole causal impetus for
American SDM efforts.258) Second, the ACL was a crucial importer of
Article 12 jurisprudence in the United States.259 Not only did the ACL help
255

256

257

258

259

Peter Blanck & Jonathan G. Martinis, “The Right to Make Choices”: The National Resource Center for
Supported Decision-Making, 3 AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES 24, 28 (2015); see also
ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING, Supported Decision Making Across the Lifespan Planning Grant (Sept. 21,
2021), https://acl.gov/grants/supported-decision-making-across-lifespan-planning-grant
[https://perma.cc/2GC2-F7HC]. The NRC-SDM was also an immensely valuable tool for me
during the drafting process of this Article.
The National Resource Center for Supported Decision-Making Makes Awards for its 2018/2019 State Grant
Program, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING (Oct. 25, 2018),
http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/news/national-resource-center-supported-decision-makingmakes-awards-its-20182019-state-grant [https://perma.cc/84T3-SWLQ].
See id. (explaining that the NRC-SDM has funded projects in South Carolina, Tennessee, Indiana,
Mississippi, Oregon, Minnesota, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, and Wisconsin).
I must here commend Theodorou’s work on documenting the factors that led to the enactment of
the Texas SDM legislation. See generally Theodorou, supra note 238. Theodorou identifies, for
instance, that “Texas’s interest in supported decision-making predates the CRPD’s entrance into
force,” and that “its interest grew out of the disability rights community’s response to extensive
state budget cuts in 2004, which resulted in an overhaul of the state’s Department of Health and
Human Services.” Theodorou, supra note 238, at 987 (2018). Documentation like the type
Theodorou presents is the type needed to nuance and explain how each pro-SDM state came to
integrate—or reject—the CRPD in their respective legislative processes.
The role that the federal government played in catalyzing SDM laws across the United States is
not dissimilar from the role it played at the time the ADA was under consideration. In fact,
Lennard Davis has explained that federal actors, and not the disability community, were involved
in the most important ADA negotiations. The parallelism here is important to consider. See
LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST US MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 150–51 (2015) (“The
prenegotiation ground rules agreed upon and signed in blood were that the only people allowed at
the negotiating table would be representatives of the Senate and the White House. The House
staff, the business community, and the disability community would not be allowed to attend.”).
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create the NRC-SDM, but it also provided funding to the ABA to help
expand state Working Interdisciplinary Networks of Guardianship
Stakeholders (“WINGS”), which have helped propel SDM advocacy in
several states, including Alaska and Indiana.260
These findings strengthen the idea that treaty ratification is not the only
means by which human rights treaties can make their way into domestic
policy. The ACL’s involvement in stimulating SDM policymaking also
constitutes a clear example of cooperative foreign affairs federalism. But,
before I cover these issues in more detail, I turn to a survey of SDM laws in
the United States.
2. Article 12 in Legislation
What follows is a chronological list of SDM laws that states have enacted
to date,261 as well as SDM laws that remain in the legislative process. Along
the way, I highlight legislative and other documentary evidence that shows
how Article 12 has influenced legislative efforts at the state level, while also
listing other laws that seem to have flourished independently from CRPD
jurisprudence. I show that in the District of Columbia and at least nine
states—Delaware, Wisconsin, Maine, Alaska, Indiana, Nevada, Minnesota,
Colorado, and New Hampshire—the ACL and other CRPD-embracing
organizations like the NRC-SDM and the ABA played a crucial role in
fueling grassroots SDM advocacy.
260

261

See ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING, supra note 255 (describing the role that WINGS play in expanding
state capacity in bringing about guardianship reforms). As I note above, however, the ABA is not
the only organization that has funded WINGS. The National Guardianship Network, which has
shown little or no support for Article 12 principles, has helped fund WINGS in Texas and
Washington, two states that have statutes enabling SDM arrangements on their books.
I do not cover states that have passed SDM laws in the area of organ transplants, like Maryland,
Kansas, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, West Virginia. See In Your State, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING, http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/states [https://perma.cc
/8QDQ-BY8V] (last visited May 21, 2022) (listing those states that have passed laws that enable
SDM in the context of organ transplants). The reason is that although these laws bolster the
position that SDM is growing in popularity across the United States, transplant-oriented laws have
little if anything to do with the CRPD. As I have shown in Part III.A., Article 12 derives from the
tension between guardianship and SDM. The issue in the area of organ transplants, by contrast,
appears to center on discrimination. See, AUTISTIC ADVOCACY, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FOR
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS, https://autisticadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/OrganTransplantation ClinicianGuide_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F6MT-TFMK] (last visited May 21, 2022) (explaining that people with disabilities suffer from the
misconception that they cannot make decisions for themselves when comes the time to accessing
organ transplants). To include these laws in this discussion might thus run the risk of over-focusing
on SDM laws, as opposed to keeping the analysis narrowly oriented on the CRPD’s impact on
SDM legislation.
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Texas. Texas enacted the Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act in
2015,262 the first of its kind in the country. But it has no explicitly discernible
roots in Article 12 jurisprudence. As Theodorou has found, the Texas
legislature’s interest in SDM “predates the CRPD’s entrance into force” and
passed the statute largely in response to the “nationwide concern about the
ability of state courts to process and monitor the enormous influx of
guardianship cases predicted to accompany the aging of the population.”263
Propelling the statute’s enactment was “the traditionally conservative belief
that family and private charity, not the state, should provide support to those
who need assistance.”264 The Texas SDM statute thus “shows that at least
some forms of supported decision-making can have broad appeal in
conservative legislatures where lawmakers may be skeptical” of international
human rights developments.265
Delaware. Delaware followed suit in 2016.266 Before the Delaware
legislature enacted its SDM statute, the Delaware Developmental
Disabilities Council (“DDDC”) received a grant sponsored by the NRCSDM, which played a catalyzing role in driving SDM awareness-raising in
the state.267 As part of the deliverables associated with the grant, the DDDC
partnered with the Autistic Self Advocacy Network (“ASAN”)—a national
disability rights organization with a strong record of support for the
CRPD268—to assist with the drafting of the SDM bill that eventually became
law.269
262
263
264
265
266
267

268

269

TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.002 (2015).
Theodorou, supra note 238, at 979–80, 987.
Id. at 980.
Id. at 1012.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 9401a–9410a (2016).
See generally NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING, FINAL REPORT 2016
DELAWARE 1 (2016), http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/sdm-cop2016-delaware.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LZA-4KVA].
See, e.g., The Right to Make Choices: International Laws and Decision-Making by People with Disabilities,
AUTISTIC SELF ADV. NETWORK, THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHOICES: INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND
DECISION-MAKING BY PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, https://autisticadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/02/Easy-Read-OSF-For-Families-v3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67MSSP3V] (last visited May 21, 2022); AUTISTIC SELF ADV. NETWORK, ASAN’S INTERNATIONAL
SUMMIT ON SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND TRANSITION TO THE COMMUNITY:
CONCLUSIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2016),
https://autisticadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/SDM-Summit-Conclusions-and-Recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GK5A-CXQU]; White House Celebration of Disability Rights, AUTISTIC SELF ADV.
NETWORK (July 26, 2009), https://autisticadvocacy.org/2009/07/white-house-celebration-ofdisability-rights/ [https://perma.cc/KR64-JUY2].
See NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING, supra note 267, at 3 (explaining that
the DDDC reviewed model legislation provided by ASAN before introducing a draft bill before
the Delaware Senate on April 14, 2016).
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Wisconsin. The next state to pass an SDM statute was Wisconsin in
2018.270 The statute stemmed from advocacy efforts by many disability
rights organizations,271 including the Wisconsin Board for People with
Developmental Disabilities (“BPDD”), which, like the DDDC, received a
grant from the NRC-SDM.272 Part of the BPDD’s engagement efforts was
to craft a draft statute to offer to state legislators.273 During legislative
hearings, the BPDD highlighted the nationwide impact that the NRC-SDM
and the CRPD had had on SDM policy.274
District of Columbia. Mere days after Wisconsin enacted its SDM statute,
the District of Columbia enacted the Disability Services Reform
Amendment Act of 2018, formally authorizing the creation of SDM
agreements.275 Unlike the Delaware and Wisconsin SDM statutes, the
District of Columbia law did not stem from NRC-SDM grant funding.276
But several features of the statute’s history highlight how the CRPD provided
inspiration for its enactment. First, several members of the coalition
responsible for the law’s passage had spoken publicly about their support for
the CRPD.277 Second, stakeholders during hearings on the bill, including
270
271

272

273
274

275
276
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Assemb. 655, 2017 Leg. (Wis. 2017).
The Wisconsin legislature’s Legislative Council collected documents as part of hearings on the
SDM statute, including testimonials by The Arc Wisconsin, Disability Rights Wisconsin, the
Greater Wisconsin Agency on Aging Resources, Inc., the Wisconsin Aging Advocacy Network, the
Wisconsin Board for People with Developmental Disabilities, and AARP Wisconsin. See Hearing on
Assemb. 655 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Family Law, 2017 Leg. (Wis. 2017) (statement of Kathy
Bernier, State Representative).
See generally NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING, ANNUAL REPORT–2016
WISCONSIN 1 (2016), http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/sdm-cop2016-wisconsin.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W6V-SLU3].
Id.
Hearing on Assemb. 655 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Family Law, 2017 Leg. (Wis. 2017), supra note 271
(“Nationally, disability organizations, attorneys, courts, and state legislatures are recognizing the
value of SDM as an alternative to guardianship. SDM has been endorsed by the [the ACL], which
funds the [SDM-NRC], and has gained international recognition, notably in the [CRPD].”).
Disability Services Reform Amendment Act, 65.12. D.C. Reg. 002823-46 (Mar. 12, 2018).
District of Columbia: Guardianship Laws, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING,
http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/state-review/district-columbia [https://perma.cc/Z6EDCM4Q] (last visited May 21, 2022).
Six organizations along with Robert D. Dinerstein formed the coalition that drove the D.C. SDM
law’s enactment. See generally Landmark Law Advances the Rights of D.C. Residents with Disabilities,
QUALITY TR., https://www.dcqualitytrust.org/2018dclaw/ [https://perma.cc/TB9T-K2D3]
(last visited May 21, 2022). Among the organizations was Quality Trust for Individuals with
Disabilities, which has demonstrated a record of support for the CRPD. See, e.g., Symposium,
Cathy Ficker Terrill, Tina Campanella, & Kerri Melda, Supported Decision-Making: An Agenda for
Action, COUNCIL ON QUALITY & LEADERSHIP (Jan. 2014), https://www.c-q-l.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/CQL-Supported-Decision-Making-Agenda-For-Action-2015.pdf
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Disability Rights D.C. and leading disability rights advocate Robert
Dinerstein, linked the importance of the bill with the CRPD.278 Third, the
Committee on Human Services, which the D.C. Council charged to review
the bill, referred to Dinerstein’s scholarship on the CRPD in assessing
whether the bill conformed to basic implementation guidelines.279
Maine. The Maine legislature reformed the Maine Uniform Probate
Code law in April 2018, recognizing SDM agreements as a less restrictive
alternative to guardianship.280 The legislature brought changes to the statute
about one year later, although it largely kept in place the parameters that it
had set out to ensure the availability of SDM.281
Behind the scenes, Disability Rights Maine (“DRM”)—recipient of two
NRC-SDM grants282—spearheaded statewide SDM advocacy efforts.
Through its first NRC-SDM grant, DRM helped form a coalition of
disability rights organizations dedicated to reforming the guardianship status
quo.283 DRM’s outreach and mobilization efforts led it to receive an
invitation to a Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary work session to discuss
SDM.284 This discussion influenced the Joint Committee to ask the Maine
Probate and Trust Law Advisory Commission to write a report on the
feasibility and wisdom of adopting SDM in the Maine Probate Code. That

278

279

280
281

282
283

284

[https://perma.cc/3CY4-SPQ2] (associating SDM with the enactment of the CRPD). Dinerstein
has also demonstrated clear support for the CRPD through his scholarship. See, e.g., Robert D.
Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: The Difficult Road from Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1
(2012).
See Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2017: Hearing on B. 22-154 Before the
Comm. on Hum. Services, 2017 Council (D.C. 2017), (including testimonial documents by Disability
Rights D.C. and Dinerstein).
See generally COUNCIL OF THE D.C. COMM. ON HUM. SERVICES, REPORT ON BILL 22-0154, THE
DISABILITY SERVICES AND REFORM ACT, B. 22-0154 (citing scholarship by Dinerstein on how to
implement Article 12 of the CRPD).
See H.R. 123, 128th Me. Leg., First Reg. Sess. (2017)
See An Act to Correct Errors and inconsistencies Related to the Maine Uniform Probate Code and
to Make Other Substantive Changes, H.R. Rep. No. 1535, 1st Sess. (Me. 2019); Maine Uniform
Guardianship, Conservatorship and Protective Proceedings Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-C, §§ 5101–963 (2019).
See Disability Rights Maine Symposium, Supported Decision-Making in Maine, SUPPORT MY DECISION
(2019) (describing that the DRM received grants by SDM-NRC in 2015 and 2017).
See generally STATE GRANT REPORT: DISABILITY RIGHTS MAINE, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING, http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/
sdm-cop-2016-maine.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CRV-9Y6C] (last visited May 21, 2022).
See id at 9. (“On January 28, 2016, DRM was invited to speak on Supported Decision-Making
during a work session in which the Judiciary Committee considered the adoption of the [Uniform
Probate Codate].”).
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report ultimately recommended that the legislature incorporate provisions
for SDM and proposed a clear path forward to do so.285
Alaska. The next state to enact an SDM law was Alaska late in 2018.286
This law arose through concerted advocacy on the part of the Governor’s
Council on Disabilities and Special Education (“the Governor’s Council”),
which had received a WINGS grant from the ABA to expand the state’s
capacity to make broad guardianship reforms.287 The Governor’s Council
was important in mobilizing disability rights stakeholders and getting them
to support the enactment of SDM.288 One of its members, Alaska State
Representative Charisse Millett, also introduced and sponsored the bill in
the legislature.289 Assuming the WINGS grant played a necessary role in
stimulating advocacy outreach, what follows then is that the ACL’s efforts to
advocate for broad SDM implementation were highly influential in the
statute’s enactment. This finding would buttress the conclusion that Article
12, and the ACL’s desire to implement it nationwide, were guiding forces
behind the Alaska statute.
North Dakota. The first state to pass an SDM statute in 2019 was North
Dakota.290 Although little information exists about the statute’s legislative
history, what is clear is that the North Dakota Protection & Advocacy Project
(“P&A”), an organization designated by the governor to promote disability
rights initiatives in the state, played a crucial role in fostering support for the

285

286
287

288

289
290

See generally ME. PROB. & TR. LAW ADVISORY COMM., REP. L.D. 1322, RESOLVE, DIRECTING
THE PROBATE AND TRUST LAW ADVISORY COMM’N TO STUDY AND MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING, J. COMM. REP. (Me. 2017).
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 13.56.010–195 (2018).
See Please Join the Council in Supporting HB? The Supported Decision Making Act, GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL
ON
DISABILITIES & SPECIAL EDUC., https://aws.state.ak.us/OnlinePublicNotices/
Notices/Attachment.aspx?id=111074 [https://perma.cc/T85S-6VTJ] (last visited May 21, 2022)
(“The Council supported the successful WINGS grant application for Alaska, and is a lead
stakeholder in that collaboration along with the court system, the Long-Term Care Ombudsman,
and the Office of Public Advocacy.”).
See generally Anne Applegate, SDM/SDMA Progress in the Last Frontier; System-Wide Collaboration and
Focused Leadership in Alaska, GOVERNOR’S COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES & SPECIAL EDUC.,
http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/docs/events/1-sdm-ak-ppt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5395-EEHY] (last visited May 21, 2022).
See id. at 11 (explaining that the “sponsor legislator was a council member”).
See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 30.1-36-01–08 (2019).
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policy.291 The P&A also appears to have gleaned inspiration from the ABA
and the NRC-SDM in wanting to advocate for SDM legislation.292
Indiana. Governor Eric Holcomb signed the state’s SDM law in April
2019.293 The Arc of Indiana and Indiana Disability Rights, both of which
were NRC-SDM grant recipients, played a crucial role in advocating for the
statute’s enactment.294 The Arc of Indiana’s 2015 grant was to support an
analysis of the disability law landscape in Indiana, and to propose a path
forward for the enactment of an SDM law.295 A few years later, Indiana
Disability Rights received another grant from the NRC-SDM “to develop a
multi-media advocacy campaign to increase knowledge and use of” SDM
across the state.296 On top of these efforts, two other entities received grants
to expand WINGS capacity. The Indiana Adult Guardianship State Task
Force received funding from the National Guardianship Network (“NGN”)
in 2015, and the Indiana Supreme Court received further funding from the
ABA in 2017 to complement the Task Force’s work.297
Missouri. The Missouri legislature was next to pass SDM legislation.298
Although Missouri has continued to allow the use of guardianships, the
291

292

293
294

295

296

297

298

See generally About P&A, N.D. PROT. & ADVOC., https://www.ndpanda.org/about-pa
[https://perma.cc/BD4T-SCAV]; see also Supported Decision-Making Feedback Meetings Scheduled,
JAMESTOWN SUN (Dec. 11, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.jamestownsun.com/ lifestyle/
health/4541500-supported-decision-making-feedback-meetings-scheduled [https://perma.cc/
W6NJ-8TU4] (explaining that the North Dakota Protection and Advocacy Project was in the
process of collecting stakeholder input to develop SDM legislation).
See SDM FAQ, N.D. PROT. & ADV., http://www.ndpanda.org/decide/resources.html
[https://perma.cc/LB5X-X78F] (last visited May 21, 2022) (citing ABA and SDM-NRC
resources, including the pro-CRPD Resolution 113 of the ABA urging states to amend their
guardianship statutes to include SDM arrangements).
See IND. CODE §§ 29-3-14-1–13 (2019).
See Press Release, Indiana Disability Rights, Governor Holcomb Signs Landmark Legislation Supporting the
Independence
of
People
with
Disability,
STATE OF IND.
(April
29,
2019),
https://www.in.gov/idr/sdm/sdm-in-the-news/ [https://perma.cc/LR4D-UU5C] (writing that
Indiana Senator Eric Koch, who authored the bill, thanked Indiana Disability Rights, The Arc of
Indiana, and Self-Advocates of Indiana for their help in passing the SDM statute).
See generally SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING IN INDIANA: GUARDIANSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE
CASE FOR A LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE, THE ARC OF IND.,
http://www.supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/sdm-cop-2016-indiana.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B8B9-3MK3] (last visited May 21, 2022).
Letter from Melissa Keyes, Legal Director, Indiana Disability Rights, to Morgan Whitlatch &
Jonathan Martinis (Aug. 30, 2019), http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/1Indiana-Disability-Rights-Final-Report%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WPV-FXBP].
See generally ERICA COSTELLO & BECKY PRYOR, 2015 INDIANA STATE GRANT: FINAL REPORT,
(2016),
http://naela.informz.net/NAELA/data/images/PDFs/2015%20Indiana%20WINGS%20final
%20report%20without%20appendiices.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF8Z-URGR].
See MO. REV. STAT. § 475.075 (2018).
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legislature has carved out SDM agreements as “a less restrictive
alternative.”299
The Missouri Developmental Disabilities Council
(“MDDC”) has played a key role in advocating for these arrangements. How
the MDDC used the CRPD as a basis for its advocacy philosophy is unclear.
On different occasions, however, it has used scholarship on Article 12 to
justify its support for SDM arrangements.300 At a minimum, therefore,
Article 12 principles appear to have inspired at least some action on the part
of grassroots disability advocates in the state.
Nevada. The SDM statute in Nevada came into effect in May 2019.301
Unlike other states that have largely relied on disability rights organizations
to promote and raise awareness on SDM, Nevada saw much of its advocacy
performed by judges on the state’s Second Judicial District Court, including
most notably Judge Frances Doherty.302 In fact, to my knowledge, the
Second Judicial District Court was the first judicial entity to receive a grant
from the NRC-SDM.303
This grant paved the way for a statewide outreach event in November
2017, which invited representatives of the NRC-SDM, the ABA, and the
Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities to share SDM developments
with disability rights stakeholders.304 Judge Egan K. Walker of the Second

299
300

301
302

303

304

Id.
See, e.g., DEV. DISABILITIES COUNCIL, THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHOICES,
https://moddcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/MODDC-Supported-DecisionMaking-Brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7LZ-HK3R] (last visited May 21, 2022) (citing
Dinerstein’s scholarship on Article 12 implementation); Self-Determination and Guardianship,
MISSOURI DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES COUNCIL, https://moddcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/SES-Missouri-DD-Council-Guardianship-Paper-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KPL-RG9U] (last visited May 21, 2022) (citing scholarship by Peter Blanck
and Jonathan Martinis linking SDM developments with the advent of the CRPD).
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162C.010–330 (2019).
See Darcy Spears, Dignity and Choice Sought in Guardianship Alternative in Nevada, KTNV L.V. (July 17,
2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.ktnv.com/news/contact-13/dignity-and-choice-sought-inguardianship-alternative [https://perma.cc/8TS4-6F25] (describing the role of the Second
Judicial District Court and Judge Doherty in “spearheading the effort to fulfill a fundamental
promise: the right to make choices in our own lives with the support of trusted family and friends.”).
See generally Media Release, Washoe County, Second Judicial District Court Leads Statewide Event: Supported
Decision-Making as an Alternative to Guardianship—a Nevada Conversation, WASHOE CNTY. (2017),
https://www.washoecourts.com/OtherDocs/Outreach/SDMALasVegasPressReleaseRevisedFi
nal.pdf?t=6/6/2020%202:29:07%20PM [https://perma.cc/DG2X-CJ5R].
The presentation given during the November 28, 2017, event also makes mention of the CRPD.
See Supported Decision-Making As an Alternative to Guardianship, SECOND JUD. DIST. CT. STATE NEV.
CNTY. WASHOE (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.washoecourts.com/OtherDocs/Adult
Guardianship/SDMASurveys/November28SDMAPresentationMaterials.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8MX8-YNFK] (recognizing, in the PRACTICAL Resource Guide section, the role that Article
12 played in catalyzing SDM policy).
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Judicial District Court along with Judge Doherty went on to testify before
the Nevada legislature in support of the SDM bill.305 Judge Doherty went so
far as to stating on the record that “[s]ince [the Convention’s] passage,
jurisdictions throughout the United States and world have advanced formal
and informal protocols to expand accessibility of [SDM] for persons with
disabilities,” thereby indicating strong support for Article 12 policy.306
Washington. The Washington legislature also enacted a statute enabling
SDM arrangements in May 2019.307 The statute appears to originate from
advocacy work performed by a WINGS committee that the NGN helped
fund through a 2015 grant.308 That said, the NGN—unlike the ABA, which
has a record of funding WINGS committees committed to implementing
Article 12 principles—has largely stayed away from publicly endorsing the
CRPD. As Theodorou has explained, the NGN funded a WINGS initiative
in Texas that paved the way for the Lone Star State to enact its own statute.
Thus, except for evidence that shows that some members of the Washington
WINGS committee have supported the CRPD in the past, such as Disability
Rights Washington,309 little appears to show that the SDM law there stems
from pro-CRPD advocacy.
Rhode Island. The last SDM statute to pass through a state legislature in
2019 was in Rhode Island.310 Public information on the statute is scarce.
What is available, however, shows that a coalition of eight disability rights

305

306
307
308

309
310

See generally Hearing on A.B. 480, 2019 Leg. 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (statement of the Honorable Judge
Egan Walker, Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, Nev.); Hearing on A.B. 480 Before
the S. Jud., 2019 Leg. 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (testimony of Presiding Judge Frances M. Doherty,
Presiding Judge, Department Twelve, Family Division).
Hearing on A.B. 480 Before the S. Jud. Comm., 2019 Leg., 80th Sess. (Nev. 2019) (testimony of the Judge
Frances M. Doherty), supra note 305.
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.130.010–915 (2021).
In the WINGS report, the committee frames the need for SDM in terms of being able to provide
“decisional-support” for people with disabilities.
NAT’L GUARDIANSHIP NETWORK,
WASHINGTON
STATE
WINGS
REPORT
1
(2016),
http://naela.informz.net/NAELA/data/images/PDFs/2015%20washington%20WINGS%20fi
nal%20report%20no%20appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NJG-W9XN]. In one of the
legislative reports on the bill, the WINGS’s work on guardianship reform initiatives was used to
spot limitations to the bill. See H.R. Rep. 2SSB 5604, Leg. Reg. Sess., at 8 (Wash. 2019),
http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/House/5604S2%20HBR%20APH2%2019.pdf?q=20200609100931 [https://perma.cc/77HH-2E75] (“This
bill is not what would have come out of the WINGS Project. There are some limitations to the
act.”).
See S. REP. NO. 113-12, supra note 79, at 14 (listing Disability Rights Washington as an organization
in favor of ratifying the CRPD).
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-66.13-1–10 (2019).
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organizations came into existence to promote SDM across the state.311 The
mobilization effort appears to have been influenced, at least in part, by
legislative developments in other states, as well as the pro-SDM initiatives
formulated by the ACL and ABA.312
Minnesota. Minnesota passed its SDM statute in May 2020.313 The law
appears to stem from a confluence of advocacy efforts. First, the NGN
helped fund a WINGS committee in 2015, which helped galvanize
“stakeholder engagement” on SDM.314 Second, the ACL provided a large
grant to Volunteers of America Minnesota and Wisconsin (“VOA”) to open
the Center for Excellence in Supported Decision Making, which is dedicated
to developing “a replicable statewide model based on supported decisionmaking to provide alternatives to guardianship and conservatorship in
Minnesota.”315 Third, VOA received another grant in 2018, but this time
from the NRC-SDM to expand its outreach capacities.316 Together, these
efforts led Minnesota State Representative Kelly Moller to sponsor the bill
enabling SDM agreements, which eventually passed the Minnesota
legislature in less than six months.317
311

312

313
314

315

316

317

See Supported
Decision-Making, DISABILITY RTS. R.I., https://ripin.org/ripin/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/HANDOUT-Supported-Decision-Making.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
85WE-3WDP] (last visited May 21, 2022) (“[Disability Rights Rhode Island has] formed a
coalition, including Advocates in Action, the Alliance for Better Long Term Care, CPN‐RI, the
Developmental Disabilities Council, the Disability Law Center, RIPIN, and the Sherlock Center,
to promote using SDM for RI.”).
See generally Fact Sheet, Rhode Island’s Supported Decision-Making Legislation, DISABILITY RTS. R.I.,
http://riddc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SDM-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TBK
-T76A] (last visited May 21, 2022).
MINN. STAT. §§ 252A.01–21 (2019).
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES AND PROGRESS OF MINNESOTA WINGS, MINN. WINGS,
http://naela.informz.net/NAELA/data/images/PDFs/MN-Wings%20Report%20Draft%
203.docx [https://perma.cc/MW4M-MX6J] (last visited May 21, 2022); see also State WINGS
Groups
in
Action,
NAT’L
GUARDIANSHIP
NETWORK,
https://www.naela.org/NGN_PUBLIC/NGN_PUBLIC/Wings_States.aspx [https://perma.cc/
4WRE-7TPG] (last visited May 21, 2022) (listing Minnesota as an NGN grantee).
Center for Excellence in Supporting Decision Making, VOLUNTEERS FOR AM.,
https://www.voamnwi.org/cesdm [https://perma.cc/KB7E-PY5X] (last visited May 21, 2022).
The Center for Excellence in Supported Decision Making prepared a report to reflect its work on
SDM. See generally CESDM GUIDE TO SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING IN MINNESOTA,
VOLUNTEERS FOR AM. (2019),
http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/ files/
Attachment-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD5P-TPBV].
See generally NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING SUBAWARD: FINAL REPORT,
VOLUNTEERS
FOR
A M.
(2019),
http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/
files/Attachment-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6YZ-NQ96].
Representative Moller’s testimony praising the work of the disability rights coalition behind the
SDM movement in Minnesota is available on YouTube. MNHouseInfo, Changes to Guardianship,
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Louisiana. Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards signed the Dustin Gary
Act in June 2020,318 the purpose of which “is to recognize a less restrictive
decisionmaking process and empowers supported decisionmaking as an
option over interdiction for adults with disabilities who need assistance with
decisions regarding daily living.”319 Accessible information about the
statute’s history does not reveal whether individuals or organizations behind
the law were supportive of Article 12. Nevertheless, since its enactment, the
Dustin Gary Act has been promoted by CRPD-embracing entities, including
the NRC-SDM, the ABA, and the Arc.320
Montana. The first state in 2021 to pass a bill authorizing SDM was
Montana. The statute requires courts to consider “less restrictive
alternatives” in adult guardianship proceedings, including the possibility of
SDM arrangements.321 During legislative hearings,322 at least two
organizations with public support for the CRPD advocated in favor of the
measure: the American Association of Retired Persons (“AARP”) and
Disability Rights Montana.323
Oklahoma. Governor Kevin Stitt signed Oklahoma’s SDM bill into law
on April 21, 2021.324 The statute makes guardianship a matter of last resort,

318
319

320

321
322

323

324

Conservatorship Laws Discussed 3/3/20, YOUTUBE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=140&v=aGXobf9ka-0&feature=emb_title [https://perma.cc/6UJEJARS]. The reader will notice that the original bill sponsored by Representative Moller—that is,
H.F. 3391—was later folded in the S.F. 3357 omnibus bill. See Sen. Melisa Franzen (SD49) Update:
May 22, 2020, 3RD CONG. DISTRICT, MINN. DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LAB. PARTY (May 22,
2020), https://www.dfl3cd.org/sen-melisa-franzen-sd49-update-may-22-2020 [https://perma.cc
/2HNS-4SEP] (stating that S.F. 3357 includes “four policy provisions related to civil law,”
including the Representative Moller-sponsored bill modernizing the Minnesota Guardianship Law
“to create a more person-centered approach in statute”).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4261.101 (2020).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4261.103 (2020). See What Is Interdiction?, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF ELDERLY
AFFS., http://goea.louisiana.gov/assets/legalservicesfiles/interdiction.pdf (last visited May 21,
2022) (explaining that interdiction is synonymous with guardianship under Louisiana law).
See
ALTERNATIVES TO LEGAL STATUS CHANGES,
DISABILITY RTS. LA.,
https://disabilityrightsla.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Alternatives-to-Interdiction-andContinuing-Tutorships.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U2J-AQAE] (last visited May 21, 2022).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-305 (2021).
See “Require Consideration of Less Restrictive Options in Guardianship Proceedings,” MONT.
LEG. BRANCH, https://laws.leg.mt.gov/legprd/LAW0210W$BSIV.ActionQuery?P_BILL_NO1
=31&P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=SB&Z_ACTION=Find&P_SESS=20211 [https://perma.cc/
ZMD3-WFNT] (last visited May 21, 2022) (providing access to hearings on the bill before the
Montana legislature).
See A. James Forbes, Jr., Am. Ass’n of Retired Pers. Bd. of Dir., Remarks at the International Day
of Persons with Disabilities—Panel on Aging and Disability (Dec. 3, 2009),
https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/events/idpd09_aarp.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF8WZSRV]; S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 10.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 30 § 1-111 (2021).
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requiring consideration for least-restrictive alternatives like SDM. Although
the law’s legislative history is difficult to parse because of the lack of publicly
available information, two organizations with documented support for the
CRPD, Oklahoma AARP and the Oklahoma Disability Law Center, appear
to have supported the state’s legislative reform efforts.325
Colorado. The next state to pass a law authorizing SDM arrangements
was Colorado.326
Strong evidence suggests that CRPD-embracing
organizations favored the measure. Records from the General Assembly
show that five organizations testified in support of the measure, including the
Arc of Colorado, the Colorado Developmental Disabilities Council
(“CDDC”), and Disability Law Colorado. The Arc of Colorado and
Disability Law Colorado have previously affirmed their support for the
CRPD’s ratification.327 The CDDC, for its part, not only has a history of
working with NRC-SDM proponents, but the ACL also funds it entirely.
These facts reveal that Colorado’s SDM law was in no small measure a
product of federal–state coordination efforts.328
New Hampshire. Governor Christopher Sununu signed New Hampshire’s
SDM statute into law on August 10, 2021.329 Disability Rights Center-New
Hampshire (“DRC-NH") was among several organizations that offered

325
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327

328

329

Oklahoma Legislative Sessions End—Many AARP Priorities Passed Into Law, OKLA. AM. ASS’N OF
RETIRED PERS., https://states.aarp.org/oklahoma/oklahoma-legislative-sessions-ends-manyaarp-priorities-passed-into-law [https://perma.cc/87A8-ZTC3] (last visited May 21, 2022); see S.
REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 11. For Disability Law Center, see UNIV. OF OKLA. HEALTH
SCI. CTR., CTR. FOR LEARNING & LEADERSHIP, GUIDE TO COMMUNITY SERVICES IN
OKLAHOMA 3 (3d ed. 2020), https://libraries.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/Guide-toCommunity-Services_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4USX-YHYC] and S. Rep. No. 112-6, supra
note 71.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-801–806 (2021).
ARC
COLO.,
2015
CHAPTER
ACTIVITY
REPORT,
https://thearcofco.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/2015-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7LD-9TPQ]; S. REP.
NO. 112-6, supra note 71, at 11 (listing “The Legal Center (Colorado),” which is the former name
of Disability Rights Colorado).
CO DD Council Hosts Supported Decision-Making Event, COLO. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
COUNCIL (Feb. 9, 2016), http://coddc.org/blog/2016/02/09/co-dd-council-hosts-supporteddecision-making-event/ [https://perma.cc/RV5G-EQXD] (showing a collaboration between
CDDC and Quality Trust, one of the main stakeholders behind the creation of the NRC-SDM);
COLO. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES COUNCIL, The Colorado Developmental Disabilities Council and
the Five-Year Plan: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.coddc.org/Documents/Plan FAQs
%282%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/M95Q-MQF3] (last visited May 21, 2022) (detailing CDDC's
relationship with the ACL).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 464-D:1–16 (2021).
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support for the bill during deliberations.330 Not only has DRC-NH
expressed support for the CRPD, but it is also one of fifty-seven Protection
and Advocacy agencies governed by the ACL, which are scattered across the
country to offer legal and policy assistance to people with disabilities.331 What
is more, the legislature noted in its statement of findings that supported
decision-making “has been promoted as an alternative to guardianship by .
. . the [ABA].”332 These findings show that stakeholders with documented
support for the CRPD in general and Article 12 in particular were influential
forces behind SDM advocacy in New Hampshire.
Illinois. The last state to pass an SDM statute as of this writing is Illinois,
where Governor J.B. Pritzker signed the Supported Decision–Making
Agreement Act into law on August 27, 2021.333 Public information reveals
that the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, an organization
with no obvious record of support for the CRPD, helped drive advocacy for
the law.334 Still, several CRPD-embracing organizations also appear to have
supported the measure during legislative hearings, including the Illinois
Council on Developmental Disabilities, Equip for Equality, and The Arc of
Illinois.335
Beyond the eighteen states listed above and the District of Columbia,
many other SDM bills remain in the legislative process. States where bills
are pending appear to include Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New

330

331

332
333
334

335

HB-540, Relative to Supported Decision-Making As an Alternative to Guardianship: Hearing Before the S. Jud.
Comm., 2021 Leg. Sess. 2 (N.H. 2021), https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/pdf.
aspx?id=4017&q=HearingRpt [https://perma.cc/RF8X-7E9B] (statement of Michael Skibbie,
Disability Rights Center-New Hampshire).
S. REP. NO. 112-6, supra note 71; see also ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING, State Protection & Advocacy
Systems (June 28, 2021), https://acl.gov/programs/aging-and-disability-networks/state-protectionadvocacy-systems [https://perma.cc/PP34-UFQ2] (featuring DRC-NH on the drop-down list
under “Find your P&A Agency”).
H.B. 540, 2021 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2021).
2021 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 102-614 (H.B. 3849)
Several representatives from the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission offered oral
testimony in favor of the law during hearings on the measure. See Illinois 102nd General Assembly
Witness Slip Information for HB3849, ILL. GEN. ASSEM. (May 18, 2021),
https://my.ilga.gov/Hearing/WitnessSlipInfo/132930?hearingId=18556&legislationdocumentid
=166477&printerfriendly=True [https://perma.cc/C2V8-WGCN]. Plus, a close alliance appears
to have formed between the bill's main sponsor, Representative Lindsey LaPointe, and the
commission. See generally Ill. State Rep. Lindsey LaPointe, A Conversation on the Supported Decision
Making Act, FACEBOOK (Aug. 27, 2020) https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=
watch_permalink &v=3000072983455245 [https://perma.cc/E8JU-6D7Z].
See S. Rep. No. 112-6, supra note 71, at 10 (mentioning Equip for Equality as a CRPD supporter);
S. Rep. No. 113-12, supra note 79 (listing the Illinois Council on Development Disabilities and The
Arc of Illinois as CRPD supporters).
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Mexico, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia.336 Another
notable mention is Tennessee, another NRC-SDM grant recipient, which
makes no specific mention of SDM in its guardianship reform law but
included “techniques and processes that preserve as many decision-making
rights as practical under the particular circumstances for the person with a
disability” as least restrictive alternatives to guardianship.337
* * *
I now turn to a brief account of case law that has integrated CRPD
jurisprudence in their reasoning.338 I seek to open a field of discussion about
the implications of invoking the CRPD and Article 12 as persuasive authority
in guardianship cases, an issue that could gain in importance as states
continue to legislate SDM.
3. Article 12 in Case Law
Judges on New York Surrogate’s Court have incorporated Article 12
principles in guardianship cases on at least five occasions.339 To be clear,
these cases are drops in the ocean. In New York City alone, there were more
than 2,000 dispositions in guardianship cases in just 2018.340 These cases are
also unique because New York, as of this writing, has not enacted an SDM
statute. Rather, they rely on Article 12 as persuasive authority to make
certain legal determinations, such as avoiding imposing guardianships,
requiring the appointment of counsel, or demanding periodic reporting and
review of a guardianship appointment. Still, these cases remain notable for
two reasons. First, they illustrate how the CRPD has seeped into
guardianship jurisprudence at the state court level. Second, they may
become the seeds from which a more robust jurisprudence starts flourishing
across the country, especially as states continue to codify SDM and by
336
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338
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The interested reader can follow the progression of these bills on the SDM-NRC website, which
has an updated database of SDM bills. See generally In Your State, NAT’L RES. CTR. FOR SUPPORTED
DECISION-MAKING, http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/states [https://perma.cc/2ZY7QCXJ] (last visited May 21, 2022).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-101(11) (2019).
Based on the discussion above, evidence shows that those states that received at least some form of
influence from the ACL, the NRC-SDM, or the ABA include Delaware, Wisconsin, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Alaska, Indiana, Nevada, and Minnesota.
See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. 2010); In re Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 855
(Sur. 2012); In re Michelle M., 41 N.Y.S.3d 719, at *4, 2016 WL 3981204 (N.Y. Sur. July 22, 2016);
In re Zhuo, 42 N.Y.S.3d 530, 532-33 (N.Y. Sur. 2016); Proceeding for the Appointment of a
Guardian for Leon Pursuant to SCPA Article 17-A, 43 N.Y.S.3d 769, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. 2016).
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2018) (listing the number of dispositions
in New York City at 2,204 for guardianship cases).
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consequence task judges to decide when such arrangements are preferable
to guardianship.
One important and often-cited case decided by Judge Glen in 2012
concerned a petition to revoke guardianship of an individual with “mild to
moderate mental retardation.”341 Leaning on the fact that the individual
had developed a “system of supported decision making”—including
neighbors, family members, an active social worker, and a loving partner—
Judge Glen terminated the guardianship arrangement that was in place.342
The “persuasive weight” commanded by the CRPD made clear that the
individual no longer needed guardianship.343 In Judge Glen’s words,
“[t]erminating the guardianship recognize[d] and affirm[ed] [the
individual’s] constitutional rights and human rights . . . .”344
This case, along with the four others decided by New York Surrogate’s
Court, are congruous insofar as they interpret the CRPD as persuasive but
non-binding authority.345 This use of human rights treaties as persuasive
authority appears to be consistent across other state courts that have used
different non-ratified international human rights treaties to inform decisions
on controversial issues, such as same-sex marriage, juvenile death penalty,
and the treatment of incarcerated individuals.346 Johanna Kalb has even
noted that the use of non-ratified human rights treaties has gained more
traction among state courts than their ratified treaties, such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.347
This counterintuitive finding has led Kalb to argue that “advocates should
continue to raise alternative soft law uses for international human rights
treaties in state courts.”348
341
342
343
344
345

346

347

348

In re Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (2012).
Id. at 853.
Id. at 855–56.
Id. at 856.
See id. at 855. (“While the CRPD does not directly affect New York's guardianship laws,
international adoption of a guarantee of legal capacity for all persons, a guarantee that includes
and embraces supported decision making, is entitled to ‘persuasive weight’ in interpreting our own
laws and constitutional protections . . . .”).
See Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Treaties in State Courts: The International Prospects of State Constitutionalism
After Medellín, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1059 (2011) (discussing when state courts have applied
international human rights cases to controversial cases).
See id. at 1072 (“Despite the fact that many of the norms embodied in the UDHR are found in the
ICCPR and in CERD, two treaties that the United States has ratified, arguments based on their
persuasive value (as well as the persuasive value of the UDHR) seem to have gained more traction
with state courts.”).
Id.
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SDM proponents should consider Kalb’s observations as states continue
to legislate SDM. In cases like the ones outlined above, judges face a difficult
choice. They could choose to disregard the CRPD as a source of law and
focus instead on the technical requirements sufficient to find SDM as a leastrestrictive alternative to guardianship. Or they may orient their decisions
with the human rights-informed “premise that ‘persons with disabilities have
a right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law’ and ‘persons
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all
aspects of life.’”349 My hope is that lawyers will analyze the SDM laws of
their states and determine whether the Convention has played an influential
role. If evidence exists—such as would be the case in the states I have listed
above—lawyers have better reason to craft their arguments in accordance
with the demands of Article 12.
B. SDM and Cooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism
The flourishing of SDM laws and case law invoking Article 12 serve as
evidence that subnational entities have proven receptive to implementing the
CRPD. Out of the nineteen subnational governments that have enacted
SDM, at least ten—Delaware, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, Maine,
Alaska, Indiana, Nevada, Minnesota, Colorado, and New Hampshire—
have been influenced by the ACL and the ABA.350 Helped by grants
provided by the NRC-SDM, entities like the Delaware Developmental
Disabilities Council, Alaska’s Governor’s Council on Disabilities and Special
Education, Nevada’s Second Judicial District Court, and the Colorado
Developmental Disabilities Council were able to strengthen their grassroots
advocacy infrastructures and impact SDM legislative efforts.351
These findings illustrate how cooperative foreign affairs federalism
operates in practice. The principles enunciated in Article 12 of the CRPD—
349

350
351

In re Michelle M., 41 N.Y.S.3d 719, at *4 (quoting CRPD Art. 12(a)–(b)). Judge Glen recognized
a similar principle In re Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d, at 855. She explained that “[w]hile the CRPD
does not directly affect New York’s guardianship laws, international adoption of a guarantee of
legal capacity for all persons . . . is entitled to ‘persuasive weight’ in interpreting our own laws and
constitutional protections.” Id. (citations omitted).
See generally Part III.B.1.
See generally Part III.B.2. This form of federal–state coordination is consonant with what Beth
Simmons describes as “resource mobilization theory,” which “emphasizes that movement success
is influenced by tangible resources (money, facilities, and means of communication) as well as
intangible resources (legitimacy, experience, various forms of human capital or skills, etc.).”
SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 137 (citing Jo Freeman, Resource Mobilization and Strategy, in THE
DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND
TACTICS (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1978).
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most notably those of autonomy, self-determination, and equal capacity
under the law—have found support in state legislatures across the nation.
And advocates who have invoked them were compelled not by politics or
reflexive ideological affinities, but by the liberating impact that SDM would
have on people with disabilities.352 From a conceptual standpoint, therefore,
this still-developing SDM movement buttresses Beth Simmons’s view that
human rights standards can provide “useful alternative frameworks by which
the oppressed gain a sense of political identity, legitimacy, and efficacy.”353
Furthermore, the success that SDM proponents have had advocating for
themselves and on behalf of the disability community is illustrative of a
constitutional system that can accommodate the work and involvement of
non-federal entities on human rights issues.354 I consider this to be a positive
development. After all, guardianship reform exists squarely within state
authority, flowing from the state’s fundamental interest “in providing care to
its citizens who are unable . . . to care for themselves . . . .”355 Waiting on
federal involvement, while guardianships across the country continue to run
the risk of curtailing people with disabilities’ ability to participate in society
to their fullest extent, would be an exercise in vain. So, insofar as
guardianship reform efforts have not lived up to their ambitions—leaving
behind threats of stigma, ableism, and discrimination, as Leslie Salzman has
argued356—SDM advocacy at the state level has helped address, in the words
of Chief Justice John Marshall, one of those “crises of human affairs”357 to
which the Constitution must adapt.
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353
354
355
356

357

I think here of Theodorou’s caution not to ascribe SDM policymaking to some reflexive admiration
of human rights law. See Theodorou, supra note 238, at 1012 (“Though supported decision-making
has been enshrined in human rights law, . . . the experience in Texas shows that at least some
forms of supported decision-making can have broad appeal in conservative legislatures where
lawmakers may be skeptical of the UN and international human rights.”) Point taken. In state
legislatures, I would certainly agree that little evidence shows that politicians used the CRPD as
rhetorical tools, even in Democrat-dominated states. But nobody should dismiss the importance
that the CRPD—through the ACL and the ABA’s involvement—has played in catalyzing the SDM
movement in the first place. In other words, although the CRPD is seldom featured in legislative
records per se, it nonetheless has shaped their direction.
SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 141.
See generally Part III.B.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
See Salzman, supra note 253, at 298 (finding that in addition to persistent problems of overbroadness, length, and lack of oversight mechanisms, “[p]ersons with psychosocial disabilities must
overcome the significant stigma attached to psychosocial disability, the assumptions that they are
inherently different and predisposed to violence, and notions that their ‘mental defect’ precludes
their ability to reason and make a whole range of personal decisions.”).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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Finally, the role that the ACL has played in catalyzing state-based
advocacy aligns with Galbraith’s insights on cooperative foreign affairs
federalism, where “one or both political branches of the federal government
provid[e] support for the state or local action through expressions of
approval, the provision of funds, or regulatory delegations.”358 The ACL was a
key player in the creation of the NRC-SDM, which continues to this day to
advocate fervently for broad implementation of Article 12 principles.359 It
also, with help from the ABA, provided funds to expand WINGS committees
in several states, including Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Oregon, and Utah.360
One insight emerges from these findings, namely that the ACL has
successfully engaged with state-based advocates to implement SDM policy
through a host of mediating entities, notably the NRC-SDM and the ABA.
This kind of federal–state engagement is standard under a contemporary
understanding of foreign affairs federalism. As Davis has explained, state
adoption of international standards endorsed by the executive branch is one
way that subnational entities have historically engaged in foreign affairs.361
Thus understood, SDM stems from “a more cooperative model that seeks to
locate areas in which federal and state governments can, as they already do
in many areas, work together on issues of mutual concern.”362
The ACL’s role in pushing broad implementation of SDM also reveals
another, more perplexing structural facet of foreign affairs federalism. If the
executive branch, through its grantmaking powers, can unilaterally pursue
certain treaty mandates eschewed by Congress, then the President gains the
privilege of avoiding the constitutionally mandated advice and consent
process while concurrently pushing forward partisan foreign affairs policy
objectives.363 Sure, SDM is one among a broad swath of policy prescriptions
governed by the CRPD. But the implication remains that the executive
branch is in effect free to cherry-pick desirable treaty provisions, as the ACL

358
359
360

361

362
363

Galbraith, supra note 20, at 2141 (emphasis added).
See generally Part III.B.1.
See State Wings, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/law_aging/resources/wings-court-stakeholder-partnerships0/state-wings/
[https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=7380] (listing ACL-funded WINGS).
See Davis, supra note 186, at 259 (explaining that “local adoption and implementation of
international standards . . . that may or may not have been endorsed by the federal government”
is one way that subnational entities have engaged in foreign affairs).
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 305.
President Obama was unequivocal about his support for the CRPD. See generally Part II.B.
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has done with Article 12, and implement them through traditional
administrative processes.
From the standpoint of domestic federalism, this result poses no novel
problem. According to Bulman-Pozen, “from healthcare to marijuana to
climate change, federal and state executives negotiate without Congress” on
a continuous basis.364 By contrast, from the standpoint of foreign affairs
federalism, this same phenomenon raises tougher questions about the
necessity and scope of the advice and consent process itself. At a minimum,
the SDM case study shows that the Senate’s decision not to ratify a treaty
has not prevented the federal government from carrying out at least a key
component of that same treaty without structural impediments blocking its
path.
This kind of backdoor treaty implementation complexifies the binary
formulation of cooperative and uncooperative federalism.365 On one hand,
state-based organizations have freely engaged with the federal government
to advocate and push for SDM legislation.366 On the other, the federal
government has done so without clear congressional approval.367 This
arrangement, however, might neither be a bug nor a feature. It might simply
reflect the “spontaneous ordering” that federal–state relations have taken in
the realm of foreign affairs since the founding, nudging it back to
“federalism’s early days—an era in which the states played a much larger
role internationally.”368
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the Senate’s refusal to ratify the CRPD, subnational entities
across the United States have helped champion and implement CRPD
policy here at home. How they have done so is emblematic of foreign affairs
federalism—this dynamic regime in which local and state governments
exploit constitutional openings to participate on issues of international
importance.
One way in which cities, counties, and states alike have affirmed their
support for the CRPD is through expressive means—namely. resolutions.
These policies have enabled local and state governments to take an
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367
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Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 955 (2016).
See generally Galbraith, supra note 20, at 215260.
See generally Part III.B.2.
See generally Part II.B.
GLENNON & SLOANE, supra note 15, at 76, 354.
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oppositional stance toward the federal government, empowering them to
signal support for the causes of international disability justice and human
rights, and to reaffirm their role in the U.S. system of federalism. Another
way in which subnational entities have come to implement the CRPD is
through SDM legislation. Enshrined in Article 12 of the Convention, SDM
was meant to provide an alternative to guardianship by putting people with
disabilities “at the center of the discourse,”369 empowering them to decide
who cares for them and how they should be cared for.370 I have shown that
SDM laws represent, in important and often-overlooked ways, a product of
federal–state collaboration. The ACL, for example, was a catalyst for
grassroots SDM advocacy. Among those subnational governments that
passed SDM laws, at least ten—Delaware, Wisconsin, the District of
Columbia, Maine, Alaska, Indiana, Nevada, Minnesota, Colorado, and New
Hampshire—received some form of help from the ACL.
These findings show that cooperative and uncooperative foreign affairs
federalism serve as a compelling model for understanding how local and state
governments have come to integrate the CRPD within their respective policy
agendas. But, more importantly, they also make clear that even without the
CRPD’s ratification, many of the treaty’s central tenets can continue to
resonate—and become an example of how human rights can influence law
and policy, sometimes in surprising ways.
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Daily Summary of Discussion at the Seventh Session 18 January 2006, U.N. ENABLE (Jan. 18, 2006),
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7sum18jan.htm [https://perma.cc/99GDJXDL].
Series & Nilsson, supra note 26, at 366.

